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The story public family law tells about parenthood is both inaccurate and
normatively misguided. Parents are deemed "bad" because of their need for
state support, and the parent-child relationship is accordingly devalued.
This devaluation has resulted in costly and ineffective child welfare policies,
embodied in the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) and related state
laws. Child maltreatment costs an estimated $103.8 billion annually, yet its
incidence is not decreasing. Thousands of youth "age out" offoster care each
year as legal orphans, with no connection to a family and very poor pro-
spects.
This Article explores the consequences of this flawed framework, including
the failure to recognize the socioeconomic factors underlying most child mal-
treatment and the disregard for the real ties between parents and children af-
ter families are separated. It argues that child welfare policies will not suc-
ceed until the underlying parenthood framework changes; implicit cognitive
biases channel even new interventions in a way that stigmatizes marginal-
ized families and overlprioritizes adoption as a panacea. This Article con-
cludes by considering some promising paths to remapping public parenthood,
incorporating lessons from the public health preventive approach and from
the private family law system's disaggregation of parental rights and respon-
sibilities.
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INTRODUCTION
The child welfare system is broken.' More than 400,000 children a
year are in foster care, but most come out of the system worse off than if
they had stayed in their original homes. The direct and indirect costs of
child maltreatment are estimated to be a staggering $103.8 billion annu-
See, e.g., Issue Brief Rebuild the Nation's Child Welfare System, ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND. 1 (Jan. 2009), http://www.aecf.org/-/media/PublicationFiles/ChildWelfare_
issuebrief2.pdf.
' The AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 2011 Estimates as ofJuly 2012, CHILDREN'S
BUREAu 1 (Jul. 12, 2012) [hereinafter AFCARS 2011], http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/cb/afcarsreportl9.pdf.




ally.4 And yet the problem of child maltreatment persists, and our ap-
proaches to it seem stagnant and even futile.
This Article argues that the assumptions about parenthood underly-
ing the child welfare system are both inaccurate and normatively mis-
guided. As a result, the statutory scheme governing child welfare, the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), is flawed in two important ways.
It fails to recognize the socioeconomic factors underlying most child mal-
treatment and instead defines maltreatment primarily based upon nor-
mative parental behavior standards unrelated to child safety. It also ig-
nores the real ties that exist between parents and children even after
children have been removed from their parents' care, thereby channel-
ing thousands of parents out of parenthood altogether.! Consequently,
the legal system addresses child maltreatment in an ineffective, post-hoc
fashion in stark contrast to the medical community's preventive approach
to the problem.8 The failure to parse out parental rights in this context
has led to perhaps ASFA's most disturbing legacy-over a hundred thou-
sand "legal orphans."
CHING-TUNG WANG & JOHN HOLTON, PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AM., TOTAL
ESTIMATED COST OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2007),
http://www.preventchildabuse.org/about-us/media-releases/pcaa-pew-economic
impactrstudyjfinal.pdf (estimating the total annual costs of child maltreatment in
2007 including direct costs such as foster care and court oversight and indirect costs
such as lost productivity and future health problems). I use the term child
maltreatment instead of abuse and neglect, as it is more inclusive and neutral while
being equally descriptive. Abuse in particular is a very loaded term and does not
reflect the majority of cases in the child welfare system. See infra Part I.B.2.a. As I
argue below, the terms in which social issues are framed are very significant to how we
as a society understand and address them.
See, e.g., Issue Brief Rebuild the Nation's Child Welfare System, supra note 1, at 1.
6 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
7 The majority of maltreatment cases involve neglect, rather than sexual or
physical abuse. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2009, at 23 & fig.3-4 (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf. The interventions discussed herein apply
primarily to neglect cases, although some of my conclusions, such as the importance
of preserving family ties even after children are removed from their parents' care,
apply to all types of cases.
' The medical community, including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the American Psychological Association (APA), has defined
child maltreatment as a preventable public health problem. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT POSITIVE PARENTING IN COMMUNITY
HEALTH CENTERS 1 (2009) [hereinafter APA], available at http://www.apa.org/pi/
prevent-violence/resources/positive-parenting.pdf (reporting findings of a study
commissioned by the CDC).
9 The phrase "legal orphans" refers to children whose parents' rights have been
terminated but who will not be adopted, and so will likely age out of foster care alone
with very poor future prospects. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
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The system's flaws bring other significant consequences, both in-
strumental and expressive.o First, the current legal framework does not
represent how people really live, even though representing how people
live is a stated goal of family law. Second, it has resulted in costly and in-
effective child welfare policies that neither reduce child maltreatment
nor provide family stability and permanency for many children." Third,
it results in disparities between the treatment of public law and private
law families, although the only real difference between most of these
families is income. Private family law focuses on the private distribution
of wealth and applies primarily to middle and upper class families, while
public family law concerns state public benefits systems and thus general-
ly applies to lower income people." Private family law assumes the inter-
ests of parents and children are aligned and protects their ties to each
other, despite parental misconduct. In contrast, public family law parents
are deemed "bad" because of their need, or perceived need, for state in-
tervention, and their rights are accordingly limited. Essentially, the pub-
lic parenthood framework conveys disdain for the many parents who
need state support to raise their children.1
Yet these mistaken assumptions about parenthood and child mal-
treatment, what I will term child welfare's "public policy story," continue
to shape the law's response to this social problem. Scholars have pro-
posed different approaches, including variously Rrioritizing reunifica-
tion 4 or adoption, focusing on problem solving or prevention.17 Yet
'0 Carl Schneider outlined the five functions of family law, including the
expressive and channeling functions. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in
Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495 (1992). Channeling refers to the law's support of
social institutions, such as marriage or parenthood, believed to be desirable for
society as a whole, and the encouragement of people to enter into these institutions.
Id. at 505-07. As to the expressive function of family law, Mary Ann Glendon explains
that the law "tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it and which it in turn
helps to shape.. . . Indeed, it may be that law affects our lives at least as much by
these stories as it does by the specific rules, standards, institutions, and procedures of
which it is composed." MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAw 8 (1987).
" Permanency for children is the guiding principle of child welfare policy under
the ASFA statutory structure. How one defines permanency can significantly alter the
treatment of biological, foster, and adoptive families. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
1 Here I focus on the child welfare system, the government system responsible
for addressing child maltreatment, including the foster care and public adoption
systems.
1 See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A
Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 942 (1991) ("Public programs, in
other words, do not just do things in the sense of providing benefits or offering
services. They also mean something, whether this meaning is talked about in terms of
their expressive character [or] their role in sustaining and creating a particular
public culture....").
" See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in
Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1716 (2000) (book review).
[Vol. 17:1116
PARSING PARENTHOOD
while parenthood has been the subject of active debate recently in pri-
vate family law, little scholarly attention has been accorded the construc-
tion of parenthood in public family law. 8 This Article aims to advance
this dialogue by explaining the tenacity of the "bad" parent public policy
story. It looks to implicit social cognition theory, a literature largely new
to family law, to explain why these mistaken child welfare policies persist
and impede innovative efforts to address child maltreatment.
Implicit cognition scholars have demonstrated that unconscious bi-
ases can influence both how key decision-makers, such as judges and
caseworkers, make decisions, and how society at large frames and ad-
dresses a problem. 9 Stock stories and stereotypes result in the blaming of
individual actors, particularly non-normative ones, for social problems,
while allowing our socio-legal system to be legitimated as just and ration-
al. Confirmation bias and the availability heuristic prevent individual cas-
es or larger social problems from being viewed objectively or afresh-the
lens through which a problem is viewed can virtually determine the
choice of solution. I argue that the child welfare system is particularly
susceptible to these implicit biases because of the pervasive judgment
about parenting in our society, the racial and class marginalization of
parents involved in the child welfare system, the difficulty of addressing
the complex problem of child maltreatment, and the myopic focus on
adoptiono as a panacea for every child in foster care. By suggesting that
implicit biases may be shaping our response to child maltreatment, this
Article concludes that the public parenthood story must change before
fair and effective child welfare policies can be implemented.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the two-tiered
parenthood framework in private and public family law. It challenges the
widespread public policy story that individual parental misconduct causes
child maltreatment and demonstrates how this flawed discourse results in
ineffective child welfare policies and the devaluation of many families.
Part II posits that social cognition theory can help explain the persistence
of the flawed public parenthood story. The irrational human tendency to
is See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999).
16 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637
(2006).
17 See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective,
12 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 590 (2005).
" See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Why just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities To Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007).
" See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1592-93 (2006); see also infra notes
120-46 and accompanying text (outlining implicit cognition literature).
o I use adoption here to refer to traditional closed adoption wherein a child's
adoption severs all legal ties and communication with her family of origin. In
contrast, open adoption allows a child's family of origin to have ongoing contact with
the child post-adoption.
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"blame the other" and to desire simplistic solutions over complex reali-
ties applies only too well to the non-normative families in the child wel-
fare system. Part III describes two recent trends in child welfare policy:
subsidized guardianship and reinstatement of parental rights statutes.21 It
suggests that these innovations will not fulfill their promise because im-
plicit biases have shaped them to adhere to the old, flawed parenthood
framework. Part IV concludes by outlining some thoughts on remapping
public parenthood, including reframing child maltreatment as a social
problem to be approached preventively and expanding our concepts of
permanency, while parsing out parenthood.
I. Two TIERS OF PARENTHOOD
Parenthood, like childhood, is a socio-legal construct created based
on cultural norms. And the construct of parents is very different in the
22public family law system from that in the private family law system. The
following two cases illustrate these two tiers of parenthood. Typical of the
private law realm is this recent custody case: CCW and JSW, an "affluent"
23
couple, divorced when their sons were 11 and 13 years old. The court
noted approvingly that the children had attended private school and
"costly sleep-away camp" as well as traveled on "numerous national and
international vacations."24 The father JSW, a former police officer, disci-
plined the children physically, including using "nerve locks," pinching,
cold showers, and yelling.25 He also assaulted the mother in front of the
children and was diagnosed with several mental illnesses. Nonetheless,
the court granted him shared physical and legal custody.
21 I will use the same terminology as the statutory frameworks. Accordingly,
reunification refers to a child being returned to her parent before a termination of
parental rights, whereas reinstatement refers to a child being returned to her parent,
and the parent's rights being reinstated, after a termination. I support reinstatement
statutes out of a pragmatic concern for the many legal orphans and other youth who
will age out of foster care with no connection to an adult. Yet the whole notion of
"reinstating" parental rights which were terminated in the name of finality and
permanency for children is nonsensical and illustrates the extent to which the
current system is broken.
2 A number of scholars have pointed out the two-tiered system of public and
private family law, beginning with Jacobus tenBroek's seminal article. See Jacobus
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964); see also Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs.
Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371
(1996) (noting this in the private custody versus public child welfare context); Jill
Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental
Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).
2 These facts are taken from C.C.W. v. J.S.W., No. 2004/004422, 2006 WL
4549771, at *1, 2 (N.Y. Sup.Jan. 3, 2006).
4 Id. at *3.
* Id.
26 Id. at *4.
27 Id. at *9.
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A typical public law case proceeded quite differently. Timothy W., his
twin brother Jesse, and their sister were removed from their low-income
mother and put in foster care when they were 10 and 6 years old, respec-
tively.2" They were removed because their mother, EW, had been in an
alcohol-related auto accident with her children, in which no one was in-
jured, and had allegedly not attended adequately to the children's dental
care. Although EW completed treatment and was deferred prosecution,
her parental rights were terminated. Her daughter was adopted, but Tim
and Jesse did not fare well in foster care: they dropped out of school in
seventh grade, were sometimes homeless, abused drugs, and Jesse ended
up in juvenile prison for burglary. Both boys repeatedly asserted their de-
sire to return to their mother and ran away to her home.
The disparate result in these two cases is best explained by the fram-
ing of the situation from the start as a private or public family law case.
The private family law system reflects the idealized vision of the caring
mother and accords parents strong rights over their children. According-
ly, parenthood in this realm exists on a continuum; for instance, custody
is often shared between parents, and even a flawed parent such as JSW is
almost always granted visitation and other rights to his child. Public fami-
ly law parents such as EW, in contrast, are designated "bad" by the very
fact of their needing state support to raise their children. As a result,
their relationships with their children are devalued and their rights rarely
parsed. This focus on individual parental pathology as a cause of child
maltreatment has led to ineffective and costly child welfare policies.
A. The Nuanced View ofParenthood in Private Family Law
The usual story of parental rights reflects the fundamental nature of
a parent's freedom to raise her child as she sees fit.2 9 As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly confirmed that "[the] primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."30 Parents are presumed to act with their
children's best interests in mind, reflecting the widespread view of the
good parent as one whose "natural bonds of affection lead [her] to act in
the best interests of [her] children."" Accordingly, parents are free to
" These facts are based on the family profiled in two articles: Maureen O'Hagan,
Kids Try to Reunite with Parents, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Bl; Josh Farley, Boys
Removed from Home Petition Court to Leave Foster Care, KITSAP SUN (Aug. 6, 2007),
http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2007/aug/06/boys-removed-from-home-petition-court-
to-leave/.
" See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (recognizing a parent's right to
raise her children as she sees fit as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (holding that parents
may choose to have their children taught a language in addition to English in
school).
' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
" Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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raise their children as they see fit. The epitome of this vision is the self-
sacrificing mother, who continues to be romanticized in both our socio-
legal system and popular culture.3 It is a truism that this vision of the
family does not reflect reality; most American families are not white and
middle class with two parents. Yet this normative vision continues to
guide family law.
Accordingly, custody and visitation are parsed in a nuanced fash-
ion. For instance, joint custody, both physical and, even more frequent-
ly, legal, has increased tremendously since the 1970s." Some states have
created a presumption in favor ofjoint custody. The increasing recogni-
tion of functional parenthood by courts and in the American Law Insti-
tute's (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, as well as the
concomitant award of rights to non-parent third parties, also illustrate
this trend. This disaggregation of rights among multiple parents reflects
a broad understanding of permanency-children can be stable and
thrive in a variety of living situations.
Courts in this realm very rarely deny visitation or even curtail it sig-
nificantly out of the widespread recognition that having both parents
maintain contact with the child and be involved in child rearing is good.
" SeeJennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice
System's Romanticization of the Parent-child Relationship, 93 IOWA L. REV. 131 (2007); see
also SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE
IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND How IT HAS UNDERMINED WOMEN (2004).
" Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform, "Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 690-91 (1998).
" See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a) (1) (West 2008); In re Marriage of
Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 693 (Iowa 2007).
3 See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 107-08 (1992) (reporting on a California
study of custody disputes between 1985 and 1989 that found that 79% of cases
resulted in joint custody, even when neither parent requested it, up from 25% of
cases before 1979).
36 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(2) (b) (2) (West 2006).
1 The most recent ALI Principles (2002) outline two categories of functional
parents: parents by estoppel and de facto parents. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (b)-(c)
(2002).
3 See, e.g., In re Sheavlier v. Melendrez, 744 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002) ("The denial of visitation to a noncustodial parent is a drastic remedy which
may be ordered only in the presence of compelling reasons and substantial evidence
that such visitations are detrimental to the child's welfare."); see also Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.375 (West 2002) (declaring "that it is the public policy of this state that
frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents after the parents
have separated or [divorced] is in the best interest of the child"). In fact, some argue
that private family law parenthood has become virtually indissoluble. Patrick
Parkinson, Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood, 40 FAM. L.Q. 237 (2006)
(outlining the shift in various countries in the construction of post-divorce
parenthood, including the U.S., towards an erosion of distinctions between the
custodial and non-custodial parent).
120 [Vol. 17:1
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This is so even where a parent has committed some wrongdoing.39 Par-
ents who have physically abused the other spouse, for example, are quite
frequently granted joint or even sole custody, and almost always awarded
visitation. 0 The parental rights of the large number of mothers and fa-
thers who abuse alcohol are similarly left intact, despite the potential risk
to children from this behavior.
B. The "Bad Mother"4 2 Story in Public Family Law
The story of public parenthood is starkly different from the nuanced
view of parenthood in custody cases, and rarely told. In the public realm,
parents are seen as "immoral" "monsters" who brutalize their children.4 3
Once a parent enters the child welfare system, often because she lacks re-
sources, she is deemed a bad parent. As a bad parent, she alone is culpa-
ble for child maltreatment, and her children would be better off with a
new, usually adoptive, family. In sum, the mere fact that a parent requires
" See Garrison, supra note 22, at 319 n.31 (citing studies of middle class divorcing
families showing that significant percentages of the parents suffered from mental
illness or had "profoundly troubled" relationships with their children); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children Afier Divorce,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 251, 253-57, 265 n.52 (2001) (outlining data showing that
parents in divorcing families engage in numerous behaviors potentially posing risks
to children, including violence and substance abuse).
0 Although domestic violence is now a custody consideration in most states, see,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2004) (outlining a presumption against batterers),
batterers continue to regularly secure visitation and custody. See Joan S. Meier,
Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: UnderstandingJudicial Resistance and
Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 657, 662 & n.19 (2003)
(reporting that courts quite frequently grantjoint or even sole custody to batterers).
" Nanette Reed, Comment, Sacrificing the Child's Best Interests: judicial Custody
Awards & Parental Alcohol Abuse, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 111, 111, 127 n.104 (2005) (citing
government data that approximately one in four children are exposed to alcoholism
in their families, but noting that courts very rarely deny legal and physical custody to
the offending parent). My point here is not to argue that the rights.of flawed parents
in the private law context should be more limited but rather to show the discrepancy
between their treatment and the treatment of similar parents in the public law
system.
41 In her seminal article, Professor Cooper Davis used the term "the good
mother" to describe the idealized parent. Peggy Cooper Davis, The Good Mother: A New
Look at Psychological Parent Theory, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347 (1996). I focus
on mothers here, as did Professor Cooper Davis, for most of the parents whose
children are removed from their care are women. Moreover, the narrative of bad
parenting that dominates child welfare is gendered in certain ways, punishing women
for behavior that might not be problematic in men. For instance, women may be
criticized for the partners they choose or for being perceived to have chosen a man
over their children. See, e.g., In re T.J., No. 04-0684, 2004 WL 1396354, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 23, 2004) (affirming a termination of parental rights despite mother's
progress because her relationship with an abusive man indicated a "decision to
choose her paramour over her children's interest").
" Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master
Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2010).
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state support to raise her children causes her parenting to be subjected
to excessive judgment and her relationship to her children to be ig-
nored.4 This flawed public policy story governs at every point of interven-
tion, from investigations of alleged maltreatment to decisions about
whether to remove a child because of maltreatment into foster care to ul-
timately, and most extremely, terminations of parental rights. And this
story governs hundreds of thousands of families at any one time.
1. The ASFA Statutory Scheme
ASFA, the federal statutory scheme governing child welfare, both re-
flects and perpetuates this punitive vision of public parenthood.4 ASFA
was enacted largely to reduce the burgeoning number of children in
long-term foster care "drift" and to expedite permanent homes for
them.4 ' These continue to be laudable goals that should guide child wel-
fare policy today. Yet the legislative history surrounding ASFA's passage,
and its implementation in practice, reflect the flawed assumption that
bad parenting alone is responsible for child maltreatment and that chil-
dren from these families should accordingly be adopted.4" At the time of
ASFA's enactment, parents in the public family law realm were viewed as
deviant, even criminal, and thus were referred to as "perpetrators."4 9 As
one Senator argued in supporting the statute's excusal of state efforts to
4' See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) (describing the public understanding of the
very poor, primarily single mothers receiving public benefits as lazy, immoral, and
largely responsible for their plight).
" It has been particularly harmful to children and parents who are farthest from
the normative family ideal, such as older children or children with special needs who
want ongoing contact with their birth parents rather than a closed adoption.
46 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 629, 670-79 (2006). The focus here is on the federal child
welfare statutory scheme because this dictates to a large degree what measures courts
must take. See Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled
Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 287 (2007)
(describing the stifling of court discretion and innovation in this realm as a result of
the increasingly rigid federal statutory frameworks and concomitant funding
streams). However, the public policy story of bad parenting also permeates the scarce
published opinions in this realm. As one court recently put it: "[I] n a contest between
a neurotic, dysfunctional, criminal, or otherwise marginal parent who, despite these
qualities, can provide minimally adequate care for a child, on the one hand, and the
state, which may have identified an adoptive placement where the child will probably
thrive and flourish, on the other, the bad parent wins." In re L.G.T., 214 P.3d 1, 18-19
(Or. Ct. App. 2009) (Schuman,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 12 (1997).
4 The difficulty of collecting and measuring data in the family law context has
been noted. See Schneider, supra note 10, at 517. Yet "all schemes of statutory
regulation are ultimately based on unprovable assumptions about human nature." Id.
at 522. Here, I do not seek to empirically demonstrate that ASFA was inspired by a
desire to punish certain types of parents, but rather to point out that this story of
parenthood surrounded ASFA's passage and that the result was a focus on channeling
children into new, adoptive families.
4 143 CONG. REc. 25,438 (1997) (statement of Sen. Roth).
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help families reunify: "[R]easonable efforts... ha[ve] come to mean ef-
forts to reunite families which are families in name only. I am speaking now
of dangerous, abusive adults who represent a threat to the health and safety
and even the lives of these children.,s
Accordingly, ASFA mandates terminations in many more cases, re-
quiring termination where a child has spent 15 of the past 22 months in
foster care."1 States that do not comply with this mandate are sanctioned
through the denial of federal funds. ASFA also excuses states from aiding
families to reunify in certain cases and prioritizes adoptions, bringing
numerous new measures and funding sources to promote them."2 This
funding scheme has created a skewed incentive system which prioritizes
foster care and adoption rather than in-home services and reunifica-
tion.5 In sum, ASFA has created a "one-size-fits-all [child welfare] model
which places poor children in foster care, terminates parental ri hts ex-
peditiously and [in theory] locates adoptive homes immediately."
2. The Resultant Flawed Child Welfare Policies
So what's wrong with this story? It seems sensible that parents who
harm their children are bad and that these children would be better off
with new families. The ASFA structure is simply enforcing appropriate
conduct by families and protecting children under the state's parens pa-
triae authority.
Yet this story is based on assumptions unconnected to reality and
thus is flawed in two significant ways: First, child maltreatment is defined
as an individual moral problem and its social-environmental causes are
ignored. Second, the relationship between these parents and their chil-
dren is devalued and families are often unnecessarily disrupted. The le-
gal framework ignores the real data about child maltreatment and family
bonds, assigning causation and blame in a way that is not legitimated and
is frequently harmful.
a. Obscuration of the Real Picture of Child Maltreatment
By positing parental character deficiencies and immorality as the
causes of child maltreatment, the public family law framework ignores
143 CONG. REc. 26,400 (1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (emphasis added).
" 42 U.S.C. § 675.
52 Id. at §§ 671, 675. ASFA was also "expected to increase the number of
adoptions" by expediting terminations of parental rights and providing adoption
subsidies. H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 7.
" For instance, in FY 2010, a conservative estimate shows that the federal
government allocated $7 on foster care and $4 on adoption for every $1 spent on
foster care prevention or reunification. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., THE
PRESIDENT'S FY 2010 BUDGET AND CHILDREN 2-3, 6-7 (2009), http://www.cwla.org/
advocacy/FY2010_PresidentBudget-analysis.pdf.
54 Sankaran, supra note 46, at 287.
" See, e.g., Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998)
(holding that "the deficiencies of a parent's character, temperament, capacity, or
conduct" can be grounds for a termination of parental rights). A state senator
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the real causes of most child maltreatment. The vast majority of child
welfare cases are neglect, not abuse, cases: neglect accounts for nearly
four fifths of cases nationally, including the majority of cases where a
parent's rights are terminated." Neglect includes both a lack of re-
sources, such as housing and child care, and a very vague standard of pa-
rental conduct. One typical state statute defines neglect to include a par-
ent who has failed to "provide adequate food, clothing, shelter ... or
supervision that a prudent parent would take" or where " [t] he child lacks
proper parental care." The vagueness of these standards leaves individ-
ual parents unaware of what behavior is expected of them, yet exposed to
significant harms if they violate this standard. It also significantly reduc-
es the law's effectiveness as a shaper or reflection of social norms, for the
behavioral expectations are unclear and hidden.
Moreover, the definition of neglect as a lack of resources results in a
large correlation between maltreatment and poverty.60 For instance, child
advocating for criminal prosecutions of mothers who drink alcohol or use drugs while
pregnant describes motherhood in a similarly moralizing tone: "I look at the tens of
millions of good mothers who make the right decisions. My mother, for instance,
smoked forever. The day she found out she was pregnant with me, she put down her
cigarettes for the last time. If we turn our back on this, we say to all these good
mothers who have made good decisions that it's meaningless to society to be a good
mother or a good father." Ada Calhoun, The Ciminalization of Bad Mothers,
NYrIMES.COM (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-
criminalization-of-bad-mothers.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
" CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2010, at 24 & fig. 3-6 (2011), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm10/cm0.pdf (reporting that in 2010 78% of children
reported to CPS were victims of neglect, 18% were victims of physical abuse, 9% were
victims of sexual abuse, and 8% were victims of psychological abuse); see also
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 7, at 23 & fig.3-4 (reporting that in 2009 78.3% of
child maltreatment reports indicated neglect, while 17.8% indicated physical abuse,
9.5% indicated sexual abuse, and 7.6% indicated psychological maltreatment); Janet
L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, judging Parents, judging Place: Poverty, Rurality, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 77 Mo. L. REV. 95, 112-13 (2012) (outlining the role of
poverty in neglect findings and terminations of parental rights).
5 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-103, 19-3-102 (2012). Virtually every state's definition
of neglect encompasses the failure to provide adequate resources to one's children.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105 (West 2009) (defining neglect as "the
failure ... to provide ... adequate nurturance and affection, food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, hygiene, or appropriate education").
' For an example of parents' understandable ignorance of the standards of child
care expected of them, see the discussion of the Alabama case infra Part II.A.3.
9 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L.
REv. 1901, 1926 (2000) (outlining the law's role in "clarify[ing] and announc[ing]
the specific behavioral expectations embodied in social norms").
6 See Richard P. Barth et al., Placement into Foster Care and the Interplay of Urbanicity,
Child Behavior Problems, and Poverty, 76 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 358 (2006). ASFA
was passed only one year after the major welfare reform legislation, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996), and legislators explicitly connected the two statutes, see, e.g., 143 CONG.
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maltreatment is seven times more common in poor families, and most
states identify poverty as one of the top two challenges facing child wel-
fare-involved families.I This correlation is so strong that child maltreat-
ment appears to trend downwards during periods of economic prosperity
62
and upwards during recession. And the lack of resources determines
case outcomes: demonstrating this, repeated studies have shown that
about 30% of foster children could be returned home if their parents
could secure safe, affordable housing. The relationship between poverty
and child maltreatment is complex, and I am not claiming that low-
income parents are more likely to abuse their children. Instead I am
pointing out that, possibly because low-income families have fewer re-
sources or are under greater state scrutiny, poverty is a risk factor for in-
volvement in the child welfare system. The current legal parenthood
framework assigns causation to this correlation: parents themselves are
blamed as bad parents for a lack of resources. In this way, the problem of
child maltreatment is privatized, as our legal system privatizes other social
problems.
The story of bad parents and the vagueness of neglect standards also
means that a finding of child maltreatment often focuses on parental
conduct that, while perhaps undesirable, does not cause proven harm to
65
children. As a result, children are routinely removed to foster care
REc. 25,438 (1997) (statement of Sen. Roth), which had a doubly harsh impact on
low-income families.
" ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4), at 5-11 to 5-12
(2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/nis4_report
congress full-pdf jan2010.pdf; Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38
WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y, 53, 73 n.97 (2012).
6 APA, supra note 8, at 7; see also Rachel P. Berger et al., Abusive Head Trauma
During a Time of Increased Unemployment: A Multicenter Analysis, 128 PEDIATRICS 637
(2011) (finding a significant increase in child maltreatment during a period of
recession).
1 YVONNE A. DOERRE & LISA KLEE MIHALEY, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.,
HOME SWEET HOME: BUILDING COLLABORATIONS TO KEEP FAMILIES TOGETHER Xii
(1996), see also MARY ANN JONES, PARENTAL LACK OF SUPERVISION: NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCE OF A MAJOR CHILD NEGLECT PROBLEM 18-19 (1987) (finding that in
approximately half of the "lack of supervision" neglect cases in New York City, parents
primarily needed child care for the return of their children); Richard Wexler, Take
the Child and Run: Tales from the Age of ASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 129, 131 (2001)
(finding that, in New York and Illinois, "families are repeatedly kept apart solely
because they lack decent housing").
6 See Bruce A. Boyer & Amy E. Halbrook, Advocating for Children in Care in a
Climate of Economic Recession: The Relationship Between Poverty and Child Maltreatment, 6
Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 300, 301-03 (2011) (outlining different possible explanations
for this correlation).
" There appears to be no comprehensive national study of the reasons
underlying children's placement in foster care or findings of neglect against parents.
Although there are no national studies, numerous local studies find that children are
removed to foster care for minor, often unnecessary, reasons. See, e.g., An Examination
of the Child and Family Services Agency's Performance When It Removes Children from and
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where there is little or no risk to them: one recent study of the Washing-
ton D.C. system found that 75% of children removed did not meet the
necessary standard of risk and yet many of them stayed in foster care for
66
weeks or months. Children are also routinely placed in foster care in
67
part for "dirty houses" and parental marijuana use. For instance, New
York City's child welfare agency often investigates parents, and sometimes
removes their children, where parents possess amounts of marijuana so
small they do not merit a misdemeanor criminal charge. They do so de-
681
spite the lack of showing of any risk or harm to the children. Such
slightly non-normative behaviors can and do result in terminations of pa-
rental rights.69
The focus on parental conduct also allows for the importation of
subjective values into the neglect determination, with some courts ex-
Quickly Returns Them to Their Families, D.C. CITIZEN REVIEW PANEL 5-6 (Sept. 2011)
[hereinafter D.C. CITIZEN REVIEW PANEL], http://www.dc-crp.org/CitizenReview_
PanelCFSAQuick-ExitsStudy.pdf. In fact, children may be removed for grounds
completely unrelated to child care, such as where "an anxious parent loses her
temper with a rude child protection investigator." See Helen Epstein, New York: The
Besieged Children, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 12, 2012, at 51.
" See D.C. CITIZEN REVIEW PANEL, supra note 65, at 5, 12, 22. In many of the
cases, children were placed in foster care because their parents needed "very short-
term" child or respite care. Id. at 6; see also Diane L. Redleaf, Protecting Mothers Against
Gender-Plus Bias: Part 1, Am. BAR Ass'N (Oct. 25, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/committees/childrights/content/articles/fal201 1-protecting-mothers-gender-
plus-bias.html (reporting that 38% of allegations against parents represented by the
Chicago-based Family Defense Center claim a future risk of harm rather than any
specific actual harm).
6 See, e.g., In re L.P., No. 79AO2-0912-JV-1215, 2010 WL 3181899 (Ind. Ct. App.
Aug. 12, 2010) (upholding a termination of parental rights for a "filthy" house and
marijuana use despite mother's successful completion of court-ordered substance
abuse rehabilitation and regular visits with her children); In re S.F., No. 02A03-0909-
JV-404, 2010 WL 246083 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010) (upholding a termination of
parental rights for a very dirty house and marijuana use); In re Keoni Daquan A., 937
N.Y.S.2d 160, *1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (applying statute making regular marijuana
use "prima facie evidence of neglect"); In re S.R., No. 2-07-454-CV, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4146, at *2 (June 5, 2008) (upholding a termination of parental rights where
the home had trash on the counter, roaches and malfunctioning plumbing); see also
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-8A-2(9) (Supp. 2012) (defining neglect to include a child
"subject to prenatal exposure to abusive use of alcohol, marijuana, or any controlled
drug or substance"). For an outline of medical findings showing a lack of harm to
children from pregnant women's marijuana and other drug use, see Susan Okie, The
Epidemic That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 27, 2009, at Dl.
8 Eg., Mosi Secret, No Cause for Marijuana Case, but Enough for Child Neglect, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2011, at Al. For a detailed discussion of the failure of parental
marijuana use, in itself, to pose a risk of harm to children, see In re Smith Jones
Children, No. NN-3S551/10, slip op. at *12 (NY Fam. Ct.Jan. 26, 2012).
9 See, e.g., In re Blackmon, No. 284391, 2008 WL 4604084, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 7, 2008) (affirming a termination of mother's parental rights where "the barrier
to reunification was [solely her] marijuana use"); In re Lisa W., 606 N.W.2d 804, 806
(Neb. 2000) (affirming a termination of parental rights based primarily upon a
continuously "unkempt household" and the mother's failure to adequately budget).
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pressly statinF that they focus on parental conduct independent of harm
to children. For instance, one family court judge has routinely advised
immigrant women to learn English or risk having their parental rights
terminated: "If the mother is able to learn English, she will ... show her
[daughter] that she loves her and is willing to do anything necessary to
connect with her."7 1 He thereby turned his personal belief about appro-
priate parenting into the legal definition of neglect, despite any psycho-
logical or other data that speaking a language other than English at
home is harmful.
Under this framework, child maltreatment is defined as behavior by
non-normative families. This same behavior when engaged in by norma-
tive families is often not punished. As noted above, many parents in the
private family law realm demonstrate many of the same flaws, such as
mental illness, domestic violence and substance abuse, yet are almost al-
ways able to maintain custody or visitation rights.7 2 Once a parent is in-
volved in the child welfare system, however, her parenting behavior is
scrutinized and even legal behaviors, such as smoking or ordering too
much take-out food, are frowned upon.7
This increased policing of even minor parenting imperfections is
homogenizing, failing to recognize the diversity of parenting styles, a
recognition which was one of the original rationales for parental rights.
And it is overwhelmingly cultural and racial minorities whose parenting
styles and practices are deemed to be problematic.7 5 For instance, shared
parenting among a circle of female relatives is a common practice in
many African-American communities, yet is sometimes deemed to be
maltreatment." Similarly, Native Americans live in large extended famil
groups in one dwelling, a tradition quite often now termed "neglect."'7
70 See, e.g., In re Cheatwood, 697 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
("[N]othing in the statutory definition of neglect suggests that a child must suffer
demonstrable harm before the parent-child relationship can be terminated.").
' Michelle Kaminsky, Can Parental Rights Be Terminated for Not Speaking English?,
LEGALZoom, http://www.legalzoom.com/marriage-divorce-family-law/family-law-basics/
can-parental-rights-be-terminated.
72 See supra Part LA; see also Reed, supra note 41, at 133 (pointing out that lower-
income parents become involved with the child welfare system because of alcohol
abuse but middle and upper income people usually do not because the "alcohol
habits of middle class families are rarely investigated by the State").
73 See Chris Gottlieb, Reflections on judging Mothering, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 371, 371,
386 (2010); Fraidin, supra note 43, at 10.
71 See supra note 29 (discussing the Meyer line of cases).
7' See Elaine M. Chiu, The Culture Differential in Parental Autonomy, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1773, 1793-97 (2007).
70 DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 59
(2002).
" Laura Sullivan &c Amy Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System,
NPR (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-
cultural-bias-fuel-foster-system (outlining the removal of Native American children in
South Dakota, often without any showing of risk or harm and their placement in
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The state, which is permitted to intervene in families only in situations of
extreme harm, now routinely enforces a panoply of parenting behaviors
that are culture- and class-specific, including some that are not even
78proven harmful to children.
Given this misguided approach, it is not surprising that ASFA has
been largely ineffective at reducing child maltreatment and has in fact
brought some significant harms. Any involvement with the child welfare
system, even an investigation that results in no finding, brings stigma and
considerable intrusion into families. Moreover, child welfare agencies
disfavor preventive services, and their focus on post hoc remedies to pun-
ish parents means that child welfare investigation results in no assistance
to families.so Essentially, state intervention "represents a missed oppor-
tunity to improve outcomes for children at high risk for future maltreat-
ment, medical problems, and behavioral problems.""' The drive towards
termination and adoption has also led states to neglect family reunifica-
tion. The most comprehensive study of ASFA's effects to date reports
both that the legislation did not improve the likelihood or speed of reu-
nification, and that states show "few innovations" in regard to reunifica-
tion than to guardianship and adoption.
Although adoptions have increased and average lengths of stay in
foster care have decreased under ASFA, far more children age out of fos-
white foster homes despite empty Native American foster homes, a practice
reminiscent of the boarding schools to "re-educate" Native Americans in the 1950s
and 1960s).
8 Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker recently described the dramatic
decrease in violence against children in the last 20 years, and argues persuasively that
"the effort to protect children against violence has begun to overshoot its target and
is veering" too far, pathologizing an array of previously acceptable parenting
behaviors. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 439-43 (2011).
9 A case wherein a child was reported for a rash which turned out to be eczema
which her parents were treating provides a vivid recent example of this. The child
welfare agency stated that it was obligated to investigate the family for 30 days anytime
a report was called in; even when the family provided proof of the child's skin
condition. Melissa Russo, Poll Worker Sees Child with Rash, Reports Family to ACS, NBC
NEW YORK (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/ACS-Call-Eczema-
Board-of-Elections-Voting-Booth-Child-Welfare-149121865.html. For an outline of
some of the harms from a child welfare investigation, see Cynthia Godsoe, just
Intervention: Differential Response in Child Protection, 21J. L. & POL'Y 73 (2012).
0 See Kristine A. Campbell et al., Household, Family, and Child Risk Factors After an
Investigation for Suspected Child Maltreatment: A Missed Opportunity for Prevention, 164
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 943, 947 (2010) (finding that CPS
investigations with no finding of neglect resulted in families who were the same or
worse off after the investigation on every indication of risk, such as social support,
family function, poverty, and maternal depression).
8 Id. at 948.
" Olivia Golden & Jennifer Macomber, The Adoption and Safe Families Act, inCTR.
FOR THE STUDY OF Soc. POLICY & URBAN INST., INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK




813ter care alone each year than are adopted. Many children also still
spend significant amounts of time in foster care: as of 2011, the average
814length of stay in foster care was 23.9 months. Foster care is not a benefi-
cial experience for most children. In addition to the obvious emotional
impact of moving homes, and often neighborhoods and schools as well,
children are sometimes harmed in foster care, including being abused by
adults or other children in the home." Significantly, all studies on the
subject agree that children in foster care have worse outcomes on every
scale-education, employment, criminal justice involvement, etc.-than
similarly situated children left home. I do not mean to minimize the
impact of child maltreatment, which is substantial. Rather, I am point-
ing out that the data show that the vast majority of children who enter
foster care because of neglect would fare better if left in their parents'
care, especially with appropriate supports.
b. Devaluation of the Ties Between Children and Their Parents
The idea of bad parenthood underlying the public family law system
has also resulted in a devaluation of the parent-child relationship. Be-
cause it turns on its head the legal system's assumption that parents love
their children, ASFA has channeled hundreds of thousands of parents out
of parenthood altogether: these parents are bad so children would most
likely benefit from the severance of all ties and membership in a new and
"better" family.88 ASFA's legislative history reflects this narrow definition
of permanency: "Children need to know that they have permanency,
which means successful, healthy reunification with their birth families or
permanency in an adoptive home."" I argue that permanency under ASFA
has been too narrowly framed to mean only adoption rather than other
stable custodial situations or ongoing connections to biological families.
8 Id. at 25, 43.
8 AFCARS 2011, supra note 2, at 2.
8 See, e.g., PETERJ. PECORA ET AL., CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, IMPROVING FAMILY
FOSTER CARE: FINDINGS FROM THE NORTHWEST FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDY 28, 30
(2005), available at http://www.casey.org/Resources/Publications/pdf/Improving
FamilyFosterCareFR.pdf (finding that one third of former foster children
questioned reported being abused by a foster parent or another adult in the foster
home); see also D.C. CITIZEN REviEw PANEL, supra note 65, at 12 (describing even very
brief placement in foster care as a "severe, possibly life-changing event").
" SeeJoseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effect of
Foster Care, 97 AM. EcoN. REV. 1583, 1607 (2007); Catherine R. Lawrence et. al., The
Impact ofFoster Care on Development, 18 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 57, 68-72 (2006).
87 See, e.g., APA, supra note 8, at 8-9 (outlining some of the harms of child
maltreatment).
" Dorothy Roberts has argued persuasively that this story also incorporates the
historical devaluation of the parent-child relationship in African American families,
who are disproportionately represented in the child welfare system. See ROBERTS,
supra note 76, at 61-62.
" 143 CONG. REc. 26,402 (1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (emphasis added).
The state was to "find" healthy families for children, rather than fix the existing ones.
143 CONG. REc. 25,438-39 (1997) (Statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
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Reflecting this limited view of permanency, parental rights are rarely
parsed out in the child welfare context. Workers making the decision
whether to remove a child often ignore strong parent-child ties.9o Once
children are removed from their parents, visitation is usualli limited and
under conditions not conducive to effective family bonding. Visitation is
used to judge parents' behavior; for instance missed visits, often a result
of inconvenient timing or transportation problems, are instead seen as a
92demonstration of the absence of parental love. As one state warned par-
ents: "repeated failure to visit according to the visiting plan shall be con-
sidered a demonstration of a lack of parental concern for the child and
may result in the Department seeking a termination of parental rights."
States admit they will use denial of visitation as a way to punish the parent
for seeming noncompliant on other issues, such as mental health or sub-
94
stance abuse treatment.
This dynamic can, and under ASFA often does, culminate in the
termination of a parent's rights, which is almost always an absolute end to
any legal contact with her child. Accordingly, contracts for post-adoption
contact are not enforceable in most states.95 Even where tremendous
safeguards are built in to ensure that such contacts are not detrimental to
children's interests, courts are reluctant to allow them because of the very
remote chance that they may impede adoption.9 This extremely narrow
vision of permanency and parenthood posits a zero-sum dichotomy be-
tween old and new parents.
Yet this framework is contradicted by families' real experiences. Nu-
merous studies detail the strong ties most children in foster care feel for
their birth parents, even if their parents do not have custody of them or
" See CTR FOR THE STUDY OF Soc. POL'Y, LINN CNTY., IOWA, INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS REPORT 11 (2011) [hereinafter IOWA REPORT], available at http://www.
cssp.org/publications/child-welfare/institutional-analysis/Linn-County-lowa-Institutional-
Analysis-Report-August-2011.pdf (noting that "[m]ost striking was that the trauma most
children experience when separated from their parents or caregivers was not
accounted for in decision making").
" PEG HEsS, VISITING BETWEEN CHILDREN IN CARE AND THEIR FAMILIES: A LOOK
AT CURRENT POLICY 7, 17-18 (2003), available at http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/
socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/visitingreport-10-29-03.pdf (making "findings ... of
great concern" that most states do not specify the frequency, duration or conditions
of visitation or recommend only sporadic visitation).
9 Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9 (quoting ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 89, § 301.210(a)). Parents may also not
be consulted about important medical or educational decisions about their children,
despite their rights to do so and a mandate for reunification. Margaret Ryznar & Chai
Park, The Proper Guardians of Foster Children's Educational Interests, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
147, 162-64 & n.76(2010).
9 HESS, supra note 91 at 8-11; see Jennifer K. Smith, Putting Children Last: How
Washington Has Failed to Protect the Dependent Child's Best Interest in Visitation, 32 SEATTLE
U. L. REv. 769, 770, 805 (2009).
" See Annette Ruth Appell, The Myth of Separation, 6 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 291,
296-97 (2011).
' See, e.g., In re Kristin Y., 712 S.E.2d 55, 68 (W. Va. 2011).
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they cannot be reunified. Children's attachments to even absent or very
flawed parents are deep, as parents play a significant role in the devel-
opment of their identity and self-esteem." Many parents can still contrib-
ute to a child's life through visits and other contacts, and children bene-
fit from relationships with multiple loving adults." Beyond their birth
parents, children also want to, and often do, stay connected to their ex-
tended families, neighborhoods and communities, realities the current
child welfare public policy story does not account for.
Even adopted children often want to retain ties to their biological
parents.o0 Most children who are adopted when they are old enough to
remember their birth parents do not see one mother or father as "replac-
ing" the other.1 "' Children who are not adopted also retain strong ties to
their birth parents, despite a termination. In fact, many of them age
out of foster care to voluntarily return to their birth parents, despite the
lack of a legal relationship between them.'
As with parental conduct, the different treatment of children's and
parents' ties in the private and public family law realms is unwarranted.
The situation and needs of children in the divorce and foster care con-
text are not so different; as Marsha Garrison has pointed out: "In both
contexts, the child's relationship with a noncustodial parent is main-
9 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 22, at 380-81 ("Decades of research have ...
established that a child's ties to his parents do not lose their importance simply as a
result of separation or loss of day-to-day contact.").
" This is true even for children who have never met their biological parents, and
largely explains the desire of many adopted children to search for their biological
parents. See Appell, supra note 95, at 295-96.
" See Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental
Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397, 407-11, 414
(1996); see also Shelley A. Riggs, Response to Troxel v. Granville: Implications of
Attachment Theory for judicial Decisions Regarding Custody and Third-Party Visitation, 41
FAM. CT. REV. 39, 43-44 (2003) (discussing psychological findings from cross-cultural
studies showing that children can develop multiple strong attachments concurrently).
"' SeeJohnson, supra note 99, at 414.
'o' See id. at 408-09.
102 See, e.g., MADELYN FREUNDLICH, CHAFEE PLUS TEN: A VISION FOR THE NEXT
DECADE 18 (2010), available at http://wwwjimcaseyyouth.org/filedownload/331. The
psychological research demonstrating this is amply supported by the experience of
children's advocates and attorneys, as well as others working with foster youth: these
children know and care about their parents and want to maintain some kind of
contact with them, despite the abuse or neglect they have suffered. See, e.g., Appell,
supra note 95, at 295. One client expressed it to me thus: "I don't care what they say.
She'll always be my mom. A piece of paper doesn't change that." See Cynthia Godsoe,
Restoring Families, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 2010, at 35.
I"s CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, IMPROVING OUTCOMES FOR OLDER YOUTH IN FOSTER
CARE 1 (2008), available at http://www.casey.org/resources/publications/pdf/
WhitePaperImprovingOutcomesOlderYouth_FR.pdf; see also GINA MIRANDA SAMUELS,
CHAPIN HALL CTR. FOR CHILDREN AT THE UNIV. OF CHI, A REASON,A SON, OR A
LIFETIME: RELATIONAL PERMANENCE AMONG YOUNG ADULTS WITH FOSTER CARE
BACKGROUNDS 8 (2008), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/
old-reports/415.pdf.
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tained through visitation and sporadic contact rather than a day-to-day
relationship.',o4 Failing to recognize the significance of these ties, the
ASFA framework harshly cuts off the parent-child relationship to enable
children to gain a "new" family. This ignores the realities of adoption-
more terminations do not add up to more homes for children.0 5
Instead, the strict timelines for terminations coupled with the dy-
namics of adoption demand have led in the last decade to the creation of
a huge number of "legal orphans," or children who have no legal ties to
any adult and who will not be adopted.'06 Thus, while the number of
children in foster care has gone down in the last decade, the number of
legal orphans, or children "aging out" of foster care, has significantly in-
creased. 07 Large numbers of legal orphans continue to be created by the
ASFA system. There were 104,236 children waiting to be adopted in
2011.109 (And this number is an underestimate as it excludes teenagers
over 16 years old with a goal of independent living or emancipation, who
are still "legal orphans.") Most of these children will not be adopted, and
'0 Garrison, supra note 22, at 379.
"'5 This truth reveals the flawed basis for Senator Jesse Helms's insistence at the
time of ASFA's enactment that, if more children were offered for adoption, the
adoptive parents would be there: "There is no shortage of [adoptive] parents." 143
CONG. REc. 25,439 (1997) (statement of Sen. Helms).
"'6 Professor Martin Guggenheim identified the growing legal orphan problem
even before the passage of ASFA worsened it. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of
Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An
Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995).
1o7 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TIME FOR REFORM: AGING OUT AND ON THEIR OWN
(2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/News/
PressReleases/Foster-care-reform/Aging-OutMay2007.pdf (finding that the number
of youth "aging out" of the system grew by 41% between 1998 and 2007, totaling 165,000
youth between 1998 and 2005); see also Barbara White Stack, Law to Increase Adoptions
Results in More Orphans, SEATTLEPI (Jan. 2, 2005), http://www.seattlepi.com/
national/article/Law-to-increase-adoptions-results-in-more-orphans-1163211.php (citing
an estimate that 5,970 legal orphans were created in 1997 and four times as many,
24,219,just two years later, post-ASFA, in 1999).
... It is hard to obtain precise data on this issue, but experts agree that large
numbers of youth continue to age out of foster care. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
supra note 107; see also ORPHAN SOCIETY OF AMERICA, ASSESSMENT ON THE STATE OF
PARENTLESS CHILDREN & YOUTH IN THE U.S. 4 (2007), available at http://www.
theorphansociety.org/pdf/OSAReportFinal%20High%20Res.pdf (estimating that
35% of the children in the child welfare system "are orphans who are eligible for or
are awaiting adoption"); Mark Courtney, Youth Aging Out of Foster Care, NETWORK ON
TRANSITIONS To ADULTHOOD POL'Y BRIEF, Apr. 2005, at 1, available at http://
transitions.s410.sureserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/courtney-foster-care.pdf
(estimating that each year, 20,000 youth age out of foster care in the United States).
0 AFCARS 2011, supra note 2, at 4. More than one quarter of these children are
between the ages of 13 and 17. Id. Moreover, analysis of AFCARS data suggests that,
once children are between 8 and 9 years old, they are more likely to continue to wait
for a family than be adopted. Amy Taylor, Older Youth in Foster Care: Challenges and




many will spend significant amounts of time in foster care.o Only 12%
are in preadoptive homes."' They have been in foster care for at least
three years continuously and were freed for adoption on average 23.6
months ago. 12 Older children constitute a disproportionately large num-
ber of those with an unmet goal of adoption and the gap between the
number waiting for adoption and the number adopted widens as chil-
dren age.1
Most of these older children will exit foster care as legal orphans, ag-
ing out to "independent living." About 30,000 children a year exit the sys-
tem with no legal ties to any family-about five times as many youth as
are adopted."4 In several cases, the child's desire for a family connection
has led to perverse legal outcomes such as parents adopting or becoming
guardians for their own biological children after a termination of paren-
tal rights."5 In the usual case where a child is a legal orphan with no rec-
ognized ties to any family, there are numerous harms, including serious
no There are numerous reasons these children will not be adopted including the
lack of adoptive parents for certain kinds of children, such as older children, children
with siblings, or those with special needs, or the refusal of caregivers to adopt, often
because of a desire not to displace or create conflict with the biological parent and
confusion about the need for adoption where the kinship caregiver is already related
and committed to the child. See Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized
Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441, 454-
55 (1996). Older children themselves often decline to be adopted, perhaps because
of ties to birth parents which are usually cut off by adoption. In virtually every state,
children of a certain age have the right to consent to or refuse adoption. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-49 (West 2002) (allowing children aged 10 and up to consent or
refuse an adoption).
"' AFCARS 2011, supra note 2 at 4. The percentage is even lower when
considering all children in foster care with a goal of adoption: as of 2011, only 4% of
children in foster care were in a pre-adoptive home although 25% had a goal of
adoption. Id. at 1.
112 Id. at 4-5.
113 Id. at 4; see also Mary Eschelbach Hansen & Josh Gupta-Kagan, Raising the Cut-
Off The Empirical Case for Extending Adoption and Guardianship Subsidies from Age 18 to
21, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 1, 5-6 (2009) (analyzing data from AFCARS
2002-06). Youth aged 12 and older constitute about half of the national foster care
population at any given time. AFCARS 2011, supra note 2, at 1 (showing 39% of
children in foster care in 2011 were aged 12 years or older); see also Sonya J. Leathers
et al., Predicting Family Reunification, Adoption, and Subsidized Guardianship Among
Adolescents in Foster Care, 80 AM.J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 422, 422 (2010) (reporting that
in 2008, 43% of children in foster care were 12 or older and 14% were 17 or older
and noting that the chances for reunification diminish the longer a child stays in
foster care).
114 AFCARS 2011, supra note 2, at 3, 5 (showing 26,286 exiting due to
emancipation and 5,152 teens adopted); The AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 2010
Estimates as ofJune 2011, CHILDREN'S BUREAU 2, 7 (June 30, 2011) (showing 27,854
exiting due to emancipation and 5,452 teens adopted); The AFCARS Report: Preliminary
FY 2009 Estimates as offuly 2010, CHILDREN'S BUREAU (July 31, 2010) (showing 29,471
exiting due to emancipation and 5,746 teens adopted).
11. See, e.g., In re Theresa 0., 809 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006); In re Cody B.,
153 Cal. App. 4th 1004 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
2013] 133
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
emotional harm.116 As one foster youth put it: "I belonged to nobody."'17
Significantly, children who age out of foster care without a stable family
connection are at greatly increased risk for poor outcomes as adults. For
instance, they are much more likely to have poor educational outcomes
including dropping out of high school, becoming pregnant before the
age of 21, and being arrested, incarcerated, homeless, and unem-
118ployed.
1I. THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM's RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
Despite the widely acknowledged failures of the child welfare system
and empirical data demonstrating social risk factors for child maltreat-
ment, the public policy story of the "bad parent" persists. Cognitive sci-
ence, specifically behavioral realist insights into the influence of heuris-
tics and implicit biases on our decision-making, can help to explain this
puzzling phenomenon. Although implicit bias has been used to examine
persistent inequities in other systems, its role in the family law realm has
been largely unexplored. Here, I do not seek to argue that decision-
makers in the child welfare realm are explicitly biased, but rather only to
draw some initial suggestions about how, once we view a problem one
way and a story of blame is told, the legal framework can perpetuate this
flawed narrative and make it difficult to view the problem objectively or
afresh."9
A. Implicit Social Cognition Theory
Recent insights into implicit social cognition round out the law's vi-
sion of human behavior, previously depicted as strictly rational by econ-
omists and others.o20 Implicit social cognition examines "how we make
"1 See FREUNDLICH, supra note 102, at 17. Significant financial harms also result
from legal orphanhood status. See Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the "Legal Orphan":
Inheritance Rights of Children After Termination of Parental Rights, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 125
(2005).
117 GLORIA HOCHMAN ET AL., FOSTER CARE: VOICES FROM THE INSIDE 1 (2004),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Foster
care-reform/foster-care-voices_021804.pdf.
18 See CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 103, at 3-4. These poor outcomes
impose large costs on society. IRA CUTLER, CUTLER CONSULTING, COST AVOIDANCE:
BOLSTERING THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR INVESTING IN YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER
CARE 1 (2009), available at http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/cost-avoidance-bolstering-
economic-case-investing-youth-aging-out-foster-care-0 (estimating the cost of the
outcome differences of the aging out population to be nearly $5.7 billion annually).
"' There appear to be no empirical studies comprehensively addressing the
potential role of cognitive biases in public family law. However, more anecdotal
localized studies often cite bias among caseworkers and other child welfare actors. See,
e.g., IOWA REPORT, supra note 90, at 13.
1o See, e.g., Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research:
Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and SocialJustice, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1119 (2006); Jerry
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
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sense of other people," including our perception of people and their be-
havior. It acknowledges that humans sometimes act irrationally and
that implicit knowledge or bias can impact a wide range of human behav-
ior. Individuals, as well as institutional actors, may be subject to cogni-
tive biases. Scholars in the social sciences and law have used theories of
implicit social cognition to explain individual decision-making in, for in-
stance, employment discrimination and criminal cases, as well as the sys-
temic persistence of inequitable social structures and dynamics. As psy-
chologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky revealed in their
groundbreaking studies of decision-making, the lens through which a
question or problem is approached can have a profound effect on the
chosen solution.12
1. Stock Stories and Framing
Stereotypes both underlie and are perpetuated by the legal system.
Representativeness bias causes us to assign individuals to a particular
group, and then unconsciously and automatically assign the characteris-
tics of the group to the individual, despite the lack of any confirming evi-
dence.1 26 Stereotypes are cognitively useful as shortcuts; we approach is-
'2 Michelle van Ryn & Steven S. Fu, Paved with Good Intentions: Do Public Health
and Human Service Providers Contribute to Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Health?, 93 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 248 (2003) (applying social cognition theory to study health care
provider decision-making and systemic inequities). I recognize the critiques of social
cognition theory's application to law, in that it may sweep with an overly broad brush,
that not all people are equally irrational, and that cognition depends upon context.
See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002).
Nonetheless, I think that this literature is still helpful in understanding the
persistence of an irrational child welfare system-irrational because of its proven
ineffectiveness and its cost. Moreover, an awareness of potential biases can give us a
more well-rounded view of the various ideals underlying and constraints limiting
public policy choices as to families.
122 See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision
Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody
Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 263 (2009); see also IAN AYREs, PERVASIVE
PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
(2001) (noting how implicit bias against members of certain races can impact a wide
range of transactions from car sales to organ transplants).
121 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739, 744 (2000).
124 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 19 (applying social cognition theory to
prosecutorial decision-making); see also Blasi & Jost, supra note 120 (discussing the
perpetuation of systemic discrimination in employment and other contexts). My
focus here is not on the intent of individual actors, as in discrimination cases, but
rather on the larger public policy narrative underlying the child welfare system.
121 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
126 van Ryn & Fu, supra note 121, at 251.
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sues using these "stock stories" and frames of reference. Frames, or
"schemata of interpretation," allow us to interpret new experiences by re-
lating them to categories or "scripts" from prior experience. They apply
notjust to our perceptions of people but also to our understanding of all
the circumstances of a particular situation: "Facts 'speak for themselves'
only against the background of preexisting understandings of social reali-
ty that invest those facts with meaning." 29 Accordingly, how an issue and
its participants are framed will largely determine how people decide to
respond to the issue: "Every frame defines the issue, explains who is re-
sponsible, and suggests possible solutions.,,1 0 Frames can distort the reali-
ty of many situations, thereby perpetuating inequities and supporting in-
effective policies.' For instance, a house fire in which small children die
can be told as a story about poverty, negligent landlords, ineffective city
oversight, or parental neglect. 3 2
Public policy stories are conveed via simplistic metaphor and arche-
typal black-and-white constructs. This allows the status quo to seem
natural, rather than a socio-legal construct. 3 4 Legal scholars such as Jon
Hanson have argued that the key policy frame of our era, "choicism," al-
lows us to attribute disparities to the character and freely selected actions
of certain people. For instance, we blame low-income people for not
having risen in the "meritocratic" American society rather than look at
the educational and economic advantages accorded to people born into
more affluent families. These "victim-blaming" stereotypes help to main-
tain the social status quo by blaming the individual disadvantaged for
their plight."' Simply put, to maintain the illusion of legitimacy in our
' Blasi & Jost, supra note 120, at 1150-51; see also ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 309 (1999) (positing that people use
stereotypes to compensate for insufficient "cognitive resources").
121 See Blasi & Jost, supra note 120, at 1149-51 & n.112; John T. Jost & Mahzarin
R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in SystemJustification and the Production of False
Consciousness, 33 BRIT.J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1994).
'2 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837, 883 (2009). These scholars, part
of the Cultural Cognition Project, have demonstrated that these understandings vary
across societal groups systematically. Id. Although a discussion of cultural cognition's
application in the child welfare context is beyond the scope of this Article, these
insights are consistent with my argument about the different ways in which legislators
and courts view private and public families.
" Blasi &Jost, supra note 120, at 1150.
13 SeeJon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame:Justifying (Racial) Injustice
in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 425 (2006).
See Gary Blasi, Framing Access to justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals, 42
Lov. L.A. L. REv. 913, 935-36 (2009).
' Berger, supra note 122 at 268 (noting that "story-myths" often prioritize clarity
over complexity).
'3 Blasi &Jost, supra note 120, at 1123.
13 Hanson & Hanson, supra note 131, at 418-19.
'" Blasi &Jost, supra note 120, at 1134-35.
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legal and social sstems, we "attributle] bad outcomes to bad people, not
to a bad world.
2. Confirmation Bias and the Availability Heuristic
A desire for certainty and closure also leads people to prefer simple
explanations over more nuanced ones, and to seek out or prioritize in-
formation that confirms their initial beliefs or theories. 3 Research
demonstrates that people process information selectively; they instinctive-
ly seek and overvalue information which confirms their initial belief or
theory, and discount evidence tending to challenge those theories." This
confirmation bias and instinctual avoidance of cognitive dissonance act
to reinforce unconscious prejudices and perpetuate existing inequities
and theories of blame and responsibility. For instance, a person's judg-
ments about a particular issue, such as child maltreatment, are likely to
be based on heuristics or "cognitive shortcuts" based on her prior uncon-
scious beliefs about parents who are accused of child maltreatment, ra-
140
ther than on evidence about the individual facts of any one case.
The tendency to judge situations according to preexisting beliefs is
worsened by the "availability heuristic" or the "process of judging fre-
quency by the ease with which instances come to mind."'4 Thus, for in-
stance, once child maltreatment is represented by the media and in poli-
cy debates as being about bad parenting, caseworkers and other decision-
makers will call upon those representations in making decisions about
individual cases. This heuristic, rather than real risk probabilities, drives
risk assessments, such as whether or not a parent is likely to harm a
child.'4 2 The fact that we rely on existing interpretations of problems
means that it is very difficult to change policy approaches to a particular
*143issue .
These implicit cognitive forces work together to reinforce the status
quo and impede social change. Gary Blasi and John Jost have outlined
how the desire to believe that the systems comprising our world are fair
and legitimate lead people to support these systems, even in the face of
contrary evidence. The disadvantaged may even be demonized as
' Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent
Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 327 (2008); see also
Jost & Banaji, supra note 128, at 10.
'3' Benforado & Hanson, supra note 137, at 386.
' See Burke, supra note 19, at 1593-94.
"o Berger, supra note 122, at 298-99.
"4 KAHNEMAN, supra note 125, at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted). See
generally id. ch. 12.
... See RICHARD H. THALER & CAss R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
' Cass Sunstein has termed this narrowing of policy options the "availability
cascade." Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 125, at 140-44.
'' Blasi &Jost, supra note 120, at 1122-23.
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"brutes" or "beasts," allowing those better off to excuse their non-action
or passive observation of suffering. For instance, mothers who are sus-
pected of maltreatment are deemed to be "bad" people who have chosen
to prioritize their own needs over those of their children. These simplis-
tic "blame frames" allow us to overcome our own discomfort with suffer-
ing or inequality by creating an illusion of justice, rather than engaging
in the difficult work of addressing the injustice itself.146
3. A Recent Case Example
A recent case from Alabama illustrates how child maltreatment can
be viewed through multiple frames.'47 In July 2011, a mother left her two
children alone in a public place for several hours. As a result, she faced
six criminal child endangerment charges. People saw her as a selfish and
irresponsible mother who put her children at risk by leaving them in a
public place unsupervised. 48 She was to blame and accordingly merited
punishment, and her children would be better off in foster care or with
other custodians.
But a deeper look reveals other frames through which to view this
case. Perhaps the mother is low-income and has inadequate child care,
particularly during the summer months.'49 Perhaps she herself regularly
went alone to the public library as a child and concluded that the
bookstore was a similarly safe place for children. Leaving their children
alone is widespread behavior for many parents, particularly those unable
to afford child care. Research indicates that 11% of children aged 6 to 12
years old are in "self-care" both during the summer and during the
school year.9 0 Parents often do not know what behavior is expected of
them. Almost all states do not specify an age at which it is neglectful to
leave a child alone or in a sibling's care.
According to the mother in this case, the children stayed for a few
hours in the reading section of Barnes and Noble and were, by all ac-
counts, well behaved and safe.'5 2 Nonetheless, a store employee called the
police.' Told this way, the story may be seen as one about a parent
" Hanson & Hanson, supra note 131, at 420-21; see also Fraidin, supra note 43.
"4 Hanson & Hanson, supra note 131, at 417.
14 See Charlene Sutherland Left Kids at Barnes & Noble to Run Errands, Faces Prison
Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/09/15/charlene-sutherland-bames-noble_n_962954.html.
148 For example, see the comments to Colleen Curry, Mom Drops Kids at Barnes
and Noble During Errands, Now Faces Prison, ABC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://
abcnews.go.com/US/mom-drops-off-kids-barnes-noble-faces-years/story?id=14518963.
1' See id.
" JEFFREY CAPIZZANO ET AL., WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE SCHOOL YEAR IS OVER?
THE USE AND COSTS OF CHILD CARE FOR SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN DURING THE SUMMER
MONTHS 6 (2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310497-OP58.pdf.
.' See Leaving Your Child Home Alone, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (2007),
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/homealone.cfm.




struggling with a lack of resources and societal support. Or of a caring
mother trying to adapt to changing, perhaps impossibly high, parenting
standards. 5 4 No longer is bad parenting the only possible explanation.
B. Blame Framing in the Child Welfare System155
The child welfare system is particularly susceptible to implicit biases
because of the pervasive judgment about parenting, the pre-existing
marginalization of families in the child welfare system, the complexity of
real solutions to child maltreatment, and the simplistic appeal of the
adoption story.1 6 Accordingly, the public policy story of child maltreat-
ment persists as a matter of parental immorality and wrongdoing.
1. The Constant Scrutiny ofParenting
Numerous commentators in both academia and the popular press
have noted the pervasiveness of today's judgmental discourse about par-
enting, particularly mothering.'57 There is abundant public dialogue
about how children should be fed, disciplined, educated, and how many
women are doing it wrong. As one commentator has written: "The litany
of issues on which mothers are judged harshly is seemingy endless, with
no infraction too small or too strange to elicit comment."' 8 Even Sesame
Street is not safe for today's children. A recent release of old episodes
contains the following warning to parents: "These early 'Sesame Street'
' The comments to one story about this case reveal both how common it is to
leave children unsupervised, or younger children in the care of older children, and
yet how contested this parenting behavior has become. See Curry, supra note 148; see
also Emily Bazelon, My Mother, My Bodyguard, SLATE (April 18, 2008), http://
www.slate.com/articles/life/family/2008/04/my-mother.my-bodyguard.html (discussing
the ferocious debates online after New York Sun writer Lenore Skenazy wrote about
letting her nine-year-old son ride the New York subway by himself).
5 The name of this section is taken from Hanson & Hanson, supra note 131.
Not surprisingly then, the few studies of child protection worker decision-
making show that their decisions are inconsistent and often reflect a range of
cognitive biases. See Bay Area Soc. Servs. Consortium, Risk and Safety Assessment in
Child Welfare: Instrument Comparisons, EVIDENCE FOR PRAc., July 2005, at 1, available at
http://cssr.berkeley.edu/bassc/public/risksumm.pdf; ANGELA WHITE & PETER
WALSH, RISK ASSESSMENT IN CHILD WELFARE: AN ISSUES PAPER 4-5 (2006), available
at http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/docswr/_assets/main/documents/research
riskassessment.pdf. There is little inter-rater reliability among the decisions of
different workers, meaning that the same facts lead different workers to make very
different decisions. See Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal Accountability in the Service-
Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 523, 558
(2009).
.. See, e.g., AYELET WALDMAN, BAD MOTHER: A CHRONICLE OF MATERNAL CRIMES,
MINOR CALAMITIES, AND OCCASIONAL MOMENTS OF GRACE (2009). In fact, the power
of metaphors about parents and parenting is so great that George Lakoff, the "father
of framing," uses images of the strict father and the nurturing parent to divide people
into two camps with different moral and political viewpoints. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL
POLITICS chs. 5-6 (2nd ed. 2002).
"8 Gottlieb, supra note 73, at 371.
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episodes are intended for grown-ups and may not suit the needs of to-
day's preschool child."159
This harsh and judgmental discourse permeates the legal systems
governing families, bolstered by vague standards such as the "best inter-
ests of the child."'60 Similarly, child maltreatment definitions are often
based on vague standards of normative parental conduct rather than
conduct connected to actual harm or imminent risk to children.'61 In this
framework, judges and caseworkers are vulnerable to importing their
own notions of parenting onto the families they deal with.'62 This wide
range of discretion allows bias to play a significant role, driving judg-
ments about parents' unworthiness. The overly simplified treatment of
the complex task of raising children allows for no nuances. For instance,
a woman who uses any alcohol or drugs is per se a bad mother.16 4
Cognitive biases can influence both individual decision-makers and
child welfare agencies as entities.' 5 Providers' unconscious biases about
certain types of parents may lead them to fail to offer these parents a full
range of options. In the health care context, research has demonstrated
that doctors are less likely to offer certain cardiac treatments to patients
they assumed were going to abuse drugs or have less social support than
166
they believed necessary. Systemic biases are particularly pernicious
since institutional change is slow, caseworkers serve as gatekeepers for in-
formation, access to resources, and eligibility for programs, and much
decision-making happens entirely outside of the court system.1'6 Thus,
. Virginia Heffernan, Sweeping the Clouds Away, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, § 6
(Magazine), at 34.
'o Berger, supra note 122, at 282.
"' See supra Part I.B.2.a.
162 Berger, supra note 122, at 284 ("Like the rest of us, judges draw on embedded
knowledge structures, and they tend to turn first to whatever commonsense
background theory [is] prevalent in the legal culture of their era"' (alteration in
original) (quoting Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 685, 686 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G.
Morrison eds., 2005))).
163 IOWA REPORT, supra note 90, at 13 (noting that stigma plays a large role in
caseworker decision-making).
' Id. at 3, 10 (noting that the county child welfare system operated on the
assumption that "any use of drugs or alcohol" can compromise parenting ability).
165 Id. at 3 (examining the "problematic institutional assumptions, policies,
protocols, information gathering and sharing, and decision making processes that
organize or drive [worker] action").
" Seevan Ryn & Fu, supra note 121, at 251.
61 See Sally Holland, The Assessment Relationship: Interactions Between Social Workers
and Parents in Child Protection Assessments, 30 BRIT. J. Soc. WORK 149, 152, 160-61
(2000) (outlining how child protective worker decisions turn most heavily on the CPS
office where they work, on their assessments of the mother's personality and on
perceptions of her cooperation with the worker); Noonan et al., supra note 156, at
555 (2009) (noting that CPS caseworker practice "ha[s] been governed more by
worker bias and the local office practice culture than by [state regulations and
procedures]" (quoting Implementation of Alabama's R. C. Consent Decree: Creating a New
140 [Vol. 17:1
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their biases can lead to significant disparities in the deliverance of ser-
vices to various parents.1 8
2. The Racial and Economic Marginalization of "Bad" Mothers
In our schemas of interpretation, the farther away something is from
the normative ideal, the less it is valued. 16 The vast majority of parents
accused of child maltreatment are low-income, and they are dispropor-
tionately single women of color.no Thus these families are particularly dif-
ferent from the white, two-parent families idealized in our law and cul-
ture."' Their difference is compounded by their lack of political power
and often substandard levels of representation in child welfare proceed-
ings. As a result, the child welfare system has not been held to the same
levels of clarity or accountability as other government programs.1
Moreover, the fact that parents in public family law are far from the
normative ideal makes them more susceptible to the theories of poor
Culture of Practice, CHILD WELFARE POL'Y & PRAc. GROUP 6, http://www.
childwelfaregroup.org/documents/AL.RCImplementation.pdf)). The high caseloads
and wide discretion accorded caseworkers, as well as the lack of any standardized
system for assessing risk to children, means that cases will usually turn on a
caseworker's impression of a parent's compliance and on the caseworker's willingness
to exercise discretion on a parent's behalf. See, e.g., Jackie Crisp, IDidn't Think I Could
Recover from My Addiction in 15 Months, RISE (2009), as reprinted inCTR. FOR THE STUDY
OF Soc. POLICY & URBAN INST., INTENTIONS AND RESULTs: A LoOK BACK AT THE
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIEs ACT 38 (2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
1001351_safe families.act.pdf (quoting a parent whose caseworker "fought for [her]"
to be reunified with her children despite her having exceeded the ASFA timelines).
' See van Ryn & Fu, supra note 121 (pointing to the potential influence of health
care providers' biases on disparities in health care delivery because the providers
serve as "gatekeepers"). These disparities can result in widely different access to
certain programs for which caseworkers determine eligibility, such as subsidized
guardianship. See infra Part III.A. In fact, some workers blatantly abuse this discretion,
deliberately undermining parents whom they do not like, even to the detriment of
the children whom workers are tasked with protecting. For a recent example, see
Garrett Therolf, County Workers Rebuked for Misusing Power in Child Welfare Case, L.A.
TIMES (Jul. 2, 2012), http://articles.1atimes.com/print/2012/jul/02/local/la-me-
dcfs-20120702 (outlining how two social workers "maliciously" contacted a family's
landlord and a child's school, resulting in the family's eviction and the child's
expulsion, because of "bad blood" between workers and the reformed mother and
how they ultimately were rebuked by the court).
60 See Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional Children in
Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 81, 115-17
(2000); see also Berger, supra note 122, at 264-65.
"0 See supra Part I.B.2.a about the complex correlation between poverty and child
maltreatment. The high correlation of poverty with race in America can result in
disproportionate representation of families of color in the child welfare system.
"' For an outline of the concept of difference, see the seminal work MARTHA
MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW
(1990); see also ROBERTS, supra note 76.
172 Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination
Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs 179 (2004).
73 Gottlieb, supra note 73, at 378.
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choices and blame used to justify unfair and discriminatory systems.1 74 As
noted earlier, the parenting practices deemed to be neglect or abuse are
often culturally specific preferences, rather than actual harmful behav-
ior.'7 5 Studies have also highlighted that workers sometimes are overly
judgmental of or intrusive into non-normative families. Ultimately, the
marginalization of these families reinforces the story of child maltreat-
ment as one of individual fault and immorality.
3. The Preference for Simplistic Blaming over Diffi cult Solutions
That our child welfare system is broken and severely ineffective is
something upon which virtually every expert agrees.'" The system serves
neither children nor their parents, and the extent of its disrepair cannot
be overstated. The services most states currently offer to families are woe-
fully inadequate and, in some instances, proven to be ineffective. Parents
are often essentiall set up for failure because of these inadequate, "cook-
ie-cutter" services.
Stock stories about good and bad parents may lead child welfare
workers to make assumptions about a parent's willingness to care for a
child that are unwarranted by the facts of the situation. For instance, a
caseworker may assume a parent is unwilling to care for a child when the
parent asks for housing assistance and expresses concern that a pending
eviction would make it difficult to care for the child. They then react by
removing children rather than offering housing assistance. Or case-
workers may see the parent's lack of progress on complex issues such as
substance abuse as a choice, rather than an illness or a public health
problem, and may try to coerce or "motivate" the parent by, for instance,
See supra Part II.B.1.
'7 Id.; see also Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIs L. REV.
1221 (2011) (outlining how culturally specific norms are often incorporated into
substantive legal standards).
11 See, e.g., IOWA REPORT, supra note 90, at 8 (documenting that child protection
workers intervened extensively into some African American families "with no clear
reason or rationale," including denying one mother unsupervised visits with her
children for an entire year despite the lack of any safety concerns); see also Dorothy E.
Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L.
REv. 1474, 1486 (2012) (outlining a recent study of the Michigan child welfare system
which found that workers stereotyped African-American women as "'hostile,'
'aggressive,' 'angry,' [and] 'loud"' and "failed to fairly assess or appreciate these
[women's] unique strengths and weaknesses related to the ability to care for
children").
11 See, e.g., Issue Brief Rebuild the Nation's Child Welfare System, supra note 1;
Sankaran, supra note 46, at 283-85 (outlining the myriad failures of the current child
welfare system).
"' Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reforming the Legal
Framework to Capture the Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y& L. 247, 285
(2011); see also Boyer & Halbrook, supra note 64, at 311-12.




filing for a termination of parental rights.o80 These stereotypes about in-
dividual cases play out against the backdrop of the larger public policy
story of individual merit and responsibility that governs child welfare de-
bates. As Annette Appell points out, this "privatization of social prob-
lems" allows the child welfare, welfare, and other public benefits systems
to simultaneously dole out assistance to "morally worthy recipients" and
punish the unworthy.18 1 Supporting families with housing, child care, and
substance abuse treatment would not only be difficult, but would also
constitute an admission that our narrative of individual choice and blame
. 182is erroneous.
4. The Appeal of Adoption and Other Panaceas
These factors are compounded by the widespread view of adoption
as the only permissible solution for most children in foster care. Adop-
tion is the ideal "simple" solution so appealing to the innate human de-
sire for closure and simplicity-it provides a clear-cut solution (a new le-
gally binding family) to a messy problem (child maltreatment) with no
apparent inconvenient leftovers, such as residual parental rights or a
recognition of past family relationships. For these reasons, adoption has
tremendous symbolic value as a type of rebirth-it represents a "legal[]
reincarnat[ion]" for these children akin to a "baptismal or conversion
experience."'8" Adoptive parents are viewed as the opposite of birth par-
ents who are involved in the child welfare system. These "good" parents
are typically middle class and thus can bring the child into a new socio-
economic milieu and a higher social status. As Naomi Cahn describes
the history of adoption, it is "a means of socializing culturally disfavored
children-of removing them and placing them in middle-class homes."8 5
Adoption's neat fit into the two-tiered parenthood system has led to
its increasing predominance as the panacea for child maltreatment.8 6
'8 See, e.g., IOWA REPORT, supra note 90, at 9.
'"' Annette R. Appell, "Bad" Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers 101 n.2
(William S. Boyd School of Law, Working Paper No. 07-07), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 028890.
12 Such an admission would also require us to take on responsibility as a society
for the poverty and maltreatment so many children face, something far more difficult
than blaming individual parents. For an historical account of the "transformation" in
the goals of child welfare agencies from protecting children from poverty and other
societal wrongs to protecting them from maltreatment by their mothers, see DUNCAN
LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN ch. 5 (2nd ed. 2004).
113 Garrison, supra note 22, at 387.
184 Id.
Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1090
(2003). This history includes the "orphan trains" of the late 19th century, on which
thousands of children from recent immigrant, low-income, urban families were
shipped west to be absorbed by more "American" farm families in the Midwest and
West. Id. at 1097.
18 See the discussion of ASFA's prioritization of adoption and the discussion of
higher funding levels for adoption, supra Part I.B.1. I plan to further explore the
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This, combined with the culture of child welfare agencies, leads many
caseworkers to see adoption as their only goal. As one caseworker put it:
" [I] t's the experience-my background, my love is adoption. That's what
I did for eight years. It really brings me a lot of joy. So, I still think in
terms of adoption as the best option." This is particularly so for young-
er children who are more desired by adoptive parents.'" Adoption thus is
framed not as at the top of the permanency hierarchy, but as the only
meaningful permanency option.
III. Two RECENT CHILD WELFARE POLICY TRENDS FAIL TO SHIFT THE
PARADIGM
The last decade has seen several apparent incursions into the "bad
parent" story in the child welfare context, including the tremendous
growth in subsidized guardianship as an alternative to adoption, and the
enactment of reinstatement-of-parental-rights statutes, which allow a par-
ent to regain her parental rights after they were terminated. These re-
forms were implemented in part to try to address some of the problems
with the child welfare system outlined above. In particular, the reinstate-
ment statutes reflect a recognition of the severe and growing problem of
the many "legal orphans" aging out of foster care with no family connec-
tions and dire prospects.
These policy trends at first appear promising, but implicit bias, both
on a systemic level and through individual workers, prevents them from
being crafted or implemented to address the widespread economic and
social factors underlying child maltreatment or to expand the notion of
permanency much beyond adoption. Thus, rather than reflecting a new
approach to child welfare or a recognition of the diverse reality of family
structures and needs, these policy trends are driven largely by the desire
for a "quick fix.""o Accordingly, the dominant discourse of parenting re-
mains largely unchanged-a matter of individual responsibility or fail-
ure-and the reforms are doomed to failure from their inception.
construction of permanency and attachment theory to reflect normative family
structures in a future piece, Permanency Puzzle.
"8 ANNA ROCKHILL ET AL., PORTLAND STATE UNIV., FINAL REPORT, TITLE IV-E
WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECT EVALUATION 2004-2009: SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP
COMPONENT 82 (2009) [hereinafter OREGON REPORT] (alteration in original), available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20100604181341/http://www.ccf.pdx.edu/cwp/pgCWP-
evaluation.php.
' Telephone Interview with Jana Heyd, Attorney, Columbia Legal Services (July
5, 2011). The Washington state child welfare agency is opposed to the reinstatement
of parental rights in any cases of younger children for this reason. Id.
' See supra Part I.B.2.b.
" The reinstatement statutes in particular reflect a somewhat desperate attempt






Subsidized guardianship allows a child to live free of state interven-
tion with an adult other than a parent, who is provided with a subsidy for
the child's care.' 9' The guardian is legally responsible for the child and
can make significant decisions on her behalf, but does not legally "re-
place" the parent as does an adult who adopts a child. Unlike adoption,
most guardianship frameworks allow for some visitation or contact be-
tween the biological parent and the child.'" Although guardianship has
been a custodial option for a long time, it was usually not subsidized until
very recently, in contrast to foster care and adoption. Without this subsi-
dy, caregivers outside of the foster care and adoption systems could only
rely on the public assistance TANF rate, which is considerably lower than
payments in the child welfare system, and so many caregivers could not
afford to take on guardianship of children from foster care. 19
Subsidized guardianship as an option for children in the foster care
system has grown extremely rapidly in the last 20 years. In 1990, only
three states had subsidized guardianship statutes, whereas as of 2010, 40
states did.'9 The passage of the federal Fostering Connections to Success
and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (Fostering Connections Act) al-
lowed states to use federal Title IV-E foster care funds for subsidized
guardianship by relatives without a waiver, thus inspiring more states to
enact such statutes.'9 5 The subsidy rates vary considerably among states,
with some states providing a subsidy equivalent to the foster care and
adoption assistance payments, and others providing considerably less.'96
Not surprisingly, the amount of the rate has a significant impact on the
success or failure of a child's guardianship placement as it does in the
adoption context.1
' For a general overview, see Cynthia Godsoe, Subsidized Guardianship: A New
Permanency Option, 23 CHILD. LEGAL RTs. J., Fall 2003, at 11. ASFA defines
guardianship as a "judicially created relationship between child and caretaker which
is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining as evidenced by the transfer to the
caretaker of [many] parental rights." Id. at 12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 675(7) (2000)).
2 See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 461, 472.
" See id. at 456.
'9' Child Welfare in the United States, CLASP (Jan. 2010), http://www.clasp.org/
admin/site/publications/files/child-welfare-financing-united-states-2010.pdf.
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949. For instance, Michigan enacted a subsidized
guardianship statute in 2009 and New York began such a program in 2010. Act of
April 9, 2009, 2009 Mich. Pub. Acts 15; Act ofJuly 2, 2010, ch. 58, 2010 N.Y. Laws 407.
' CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, STATES' SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP LAWS AT A GLANCE
2 (2004), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-publications/
data/state-subsidized-guardianship-laws.pdf.
197 See Mark F. Testa, The Quality of Permanence-Lasting or Binding? Subsidized
Guardianship and Kinship Foster Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
499, 514 (2005) (noting that the payment rates affect permanency of all types,
including in foster care and adoption); see also Leathers et al., supra note 113, at 428.
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Most states limit subsidized guardianship to children leaving the
child welfare system, usually those exiting foster care.19s It is seen as a par-
ticularly appropriate placement for certain groups of children in foster
care, such as older children who do not wish to be adopted and children
in kinship care whose providers do not want to or cannot adopt.'" Some
200
states limit eligibility to those groups. Subsidized guardianship has been
shown to have numerous positive outcomes for families involved with the
child welfare system, including fewer children in foster care and shorter
stays in care,20s and more children achieving permanent placements.2 It
also brings significant fiscal savings for states because of decreased foster
care caseloads. For instance, Massachusetts reported saving as much as
$10,000 per year on each case moved from foster care to guardianship
203
and Illinois reported total savings of over $54 million over five years.
2. Stock Stories About Ideal Families Lead to a Narrow Interpretation of
Permanency
Subsidized guardianship fails to significantly alter the public policy
story in part because stereotypes about ideal family structures lead it to
be viewed as a narrow exception for a select group of families who do not
fit into the preferred categories of biological or adoptive families. For in-
stance, federal and many state laws limit subsidized guardianship to kin
caregivers.204 Restrictive definitions of kin often further narrow the pro-
205
grams.
'98 CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, supra note 196, at 1.
'99 See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 471.
200 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11386(e) (West 2012) (requiring child to
be residing with relative guardian for six months and limiting eligibility to children at
least 12 years of age); NEV. REV. STAT. § 422A.650(2) (2011) (requiring child to be
placed with qualifying relative for not less than six months); see also CHILDREN'S DEF.
FUND, supra note 196, at 15 tbl.III.
201 Guardianship in some states has been shown to reduce stays in foster care
from 22% to 43% or more. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP: CHILD WELFARE WAIVER DEMONSTRATIONS ii, 18
(2011), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/subsidized.pdf.
202 See Schwartz, supra note 110, at 457.
2m CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 201, at 29; Subsidized Guardianship, NAT'L
ABANDONED INFANTS ASSISTANCE RESOURCE CTR. 5 (Dec. 2005), http://aia.berkeley.
edu/media/pdf/2005_subsidizedguardianshipfactLsheet.pdf; see also MARYLEE ALLEN
& MARY BISSELL, CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, EXPANDING PERMANENCY OPTIONS FOR
CHILDREN: A GUIDE TO SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP PROGRAMS (2003), available at
http://cdfchildrensdefense.org/site/DocServer/subsidy-guide.pdfpdoclD=917.
2m See CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, supra note 196, at 3, 8-9 (outlining numerous
states restricting guardianship to kin caregivers).
2 For example, see Idaho's definition of relative: "An individual having a
relationship with a child by blood, marriage or adoption. Such individuals include
grandparents, siblings and extended family members such as aunts, uncles and cousins."





Subsidized guardianship also remains vastly underutilized in prac-
tice. For instance, in 2011, only 4% of children in foster care had subsi-
dized guardianship as their goal, far less than the 25% with an adoption
goal, and even less than those having the admittedly undesirable goals of
long term foster care (6%) or emancipation (5%) .20 Experts studying
subsidized guardianship systems have noted the fact that it is frequently
not offered to families in situations where it is an appropriate option.
The desire for simplicity and stock stories about worthy families re-
sult in a continued priority of adoption over subsidized guardianship.
Accordingly, virtually all states require that adoption be ruled out before
subsidized guardianship is an option, and continue to fund adoption at
higher rates than guardianship. * These "rule-out" requirements are con-
tradicted by studies showing that guardianship usually feels as permanent
and secure as adoption for children, and that where the programs are
funded at the same levels, guardianship and adoption are equally likely
209to succeed over time.
Consistent with the implicit cognition literature discussed above, un-
conscious biases can lead workers to make decisions based on en-
trenched practices and their own preferences, rather than on empirical
research or the needs of families. Accordingly, workers often refuse to
believe the data that subsidized guardianship is usually as permanent as
adoption; as one worker put it:
[Subsidized guardianship] is not the most permanent plan for the
kids. Not the same ownership, level of responsibility, or commit-
ment to the child. The kid still knows that that's the guardian, not
the parent. The kid knows that this person didn't want to adopt.
That's why we always strive for adoption, because the psychological
benefits are much better for the kid.1
206 AFCARS 2011, supra note 2, at 1; see also OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at
9-10 (finding that subsidized guardianship is underutilized).
207 OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 10; see also CHILDREN'S BUREAU, Supra
note 201, at iii.
20s CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, supra note 196, at 14-15 tbl.1II. The adoption rule-out
is also a requirement under the federal Fostering Connections Act. 42 U.S.C.
§'673(d) (3) (A) (ii) (Supp. II 2008). Sometimes this finding of unadoptability is to be
made by the court, and sometimes the child welfare agency is the initial gatekeeper,
having the power to screen cases before subsidized guardianship can even be
proposed as an option in court. This is the case, for instance, in New York.
209 See discussion infra Part III.A.2; see also Mary Bissell & Karina Kirana,
Children's Defense Fund, Establishing Permanence: How Permanent Is It?, in USING
SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN 13, 14-15 (Mary
Bissell & Jennifer L. Miller eds., 2004), available at http://www.childrensdefense.
org/child-research-data-publications/data/using-subsidized-guardianship-improve-
outcomes.pdf. (noting the extremely low dissolution rates of the nation's largest
subsidized guardianship programs in Illinois and California).
210 OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 92 (emphasis added).
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Acting upon their unsupported bias towards adoptive families, many
workers fail to inform families about guardianship." Other workers mis-
lead caregivers about guardianship or "pressure" them to go along with
212
the agency preference for adoption. Workers sometimes even threaten
families with removal of the children in their care or actually move teen-
agers out of secure kinship homes into non-kinship pre-adoptive homes if
the kinship caregiver refuses to adopt.2 13 These agency practices are di-
rectly contradictory to the psychological literature on permanency and
the likelihood of adoption disruption, particularly for older children.
B. Reinstatement ofParental Rights Statutes
1. State Laws
Another very recent trend illustrating a potential incursion into the
dominant narrative is the reinstatement of parental rights after a termi-
nation. Eleven states have enacted statutes in the last six years permitting
the reinstatement of parental rights, and several more have similar legis-
lation pendin . California was the first state to pass reinstatement legisla-
tion, in 2005, and since then, Nevada, Washington, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, Illinois, Hawaii, Alaska, New York, North Carolina, and Maine
have enacted similar legislation.1 Minnesota and Georgia have intro-
duced similar bills.21 The laws differ in several key respects, including
who may petition the court for reinstatement and under what circum-
stances. For instance, some states only allow the child (or child's lawyer)
to petition for reinstatement of parental rights. 2 17 Nevada allows only the
child or the child's legal custodian or guardian to do so.21 In others, only
211 Id. at 10, 26; see also CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 201 at iii (finding that
workers "expressed reluctance to offer [subsidized guardianship] due to deep-seated
professional beliefs regarding the preferability of adoption").
212 OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 75.
213 Kendra Hurley, Preserving Family Ties, 15 CHILD WELFARE WATCH 8, 11-13
(2008); see also MaryLee Allen & Beth Davis-Pratt, The Impact of ASFA on Family
Connections for Children, in CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF Soc. POLICY & URBAN INST.,
INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIEs ACT 70,
74 (2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001351-safefamilies-act.pdf (noting
the inconsistent application of ASFA in California and also finding that the
prioritization of adoption led caseworkers to pressure caregivers to adopt or risk
losing custody of, and contact with, children in their care).
21 Act of Oct. 7, 2005, ch. 634, 2005 Cal. Stat. 4837.
21 ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-63 (2006); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-28, 405/2-34 (Supp. 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1051
(Supp. 2012); ME. REv. STAT. tit.22, § 4059 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.170 (2011);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 635-37 (McKinney Supp. 2012); Act of June 24, 2011, ch. 295,
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1157; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-909 (2009); WASH. REV.
CODEANN. § 13.34.215 (West Supp. 2012).
2" H.B. 641, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); S.B. 127, 151st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011); H.B. 749, 87th Leg. (Minn. 2011).
217 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(h) (3) (C) (i) (3) (West 2012).




the state child welfare agency, or a parent who voluntarily relinquished
his or her parental rights, may do so. 20 Still other states grant multiple
parties standing to bring such petitions including parents whose ri hts
have been involuntarily terminated and the child protective agency,2 or
222the agency and the child, or all three.
The cases eligible for reinstatement proceedings vary. Every state
mandates a certain time period between the termination and a rein-
statement proceeding, from one year, as in Hawaii, to two years, as in
New York, or even three years, as in California, Illinois, Oklahoma and
Washington.2 The most common findings required for reinstatement
include that a child is not likely to be adopted or otherwise achieve
"permanency",2 or is not in a "permanent" placement,225 and that rein-
statement is in the child's best interest.2N Additionally, a few states re-
quire findings that the parent is capable of providing appropriate care
for the child or even that there has been a "material change" in the par-
227
ent's circumstances. Every state except Nevada requires that the rein-
statement be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the same stand-
ard used in terminations of parental rights. 2 The consent of one or
more parties to the original termination is usually required, for instance
"o For example, in Illinois, a motion to reinstate parental rights can only be filed
by the Department of Children and Family Services. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
405/2-34.
220 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.089. Advocates have postulated that this
distinction might have been made because parents who voluntarily surrender their
rights are more worthy than those whose rights are terminated after a contested
hearing. However, this distinction may not be so meaningful as parents often do not
actually surrender their rights voluntarily; rather, they are pressured to do so or do so
under threat of a termination proceeding.
211 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-63 (2006).
22 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 636 (McKinney Supp. 2012).
.. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26; HAW. REv. STAT. § 587A-34; 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 405/1-18; Family Court Act, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 635 (West Supp. 2012);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4--909 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215
(West Supp. 2012).
221 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26; 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/2-34.
2 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215. This has been interpreted by attorneys
and caseworkers to include situations where the child is in a pre-adoptive placement,
with a guardian, or with a third party custodian. Telephone Interview with Jana Heyd,
supra note 188.
22 Washington, for example, lists several factors for courts to consider when
making a "best interests" determination, including the age, maturity, and ability of
the child to express a preference. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215 (7).
2 HAW. REV. STAT. § 587A-34; ME. REv. STAT. tit.22, § 4059 (2011) (requiring
the petition to show facts constituting "a substantial change in circumstances" and
requiring the judge to consider extent to which parent has "remedied the
circumstances that resulted in the termination of parental rights").
22' NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.190(3) (2011) (requiring preponderance of the
evidence standard); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
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229 230
the child and sometimes the parentno or agency.3  In some jurisdic-
tions, the reinstatement may be conditionally granted to allow for par-
ent-child visitation or reunification before parental rights are perma-
nently reinstated.3  Some states, such as New York, exclude cases of abuse
and limit reinstatement to terminations based on abandonment, mental
illness, or permanent neglect.2 " Finally, about half the states limit rein-
statement to cases involving older youth, those who are the hardest to
place for adoption and who usually must consent to adoption under state
law. 234
The impetus behind reinstatement statutes is largely uniform: they
are an attempt to address the large number of legal orphans created by
the increase in terminations under ASFA. This problem has been in-
creasingly recognized by courts, policy institutes and others." The legis-
lative history of reinstatement statutes acknowledges that legal orphans
face both social stigma and financial disadvantages, that children do
better if they "have a significant connection to an adult,"23 8 and that states
2" HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-63; NEV. REv. STAT. § 128.190 (for children 14 and
older).
2o NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.170 (2011) (requiring the "natural parent or parents"'
written consent).
25' New York, for instance, requires the consent of all three parties but the failure
to obtain consent of the agency can be excused if the court finds consent was denied
without good cause. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 637 (McKinney Supp. 2012).
22 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. §§ 635-637.
231 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 637.
214 See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/2-34 (Supp. 2012) (child 13 or older
or the younger sibling of child 13 or older seeking reinstatement); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 128.190 (child 14 or older who consents, or if child is under 14, court shall specify
the factual basis of the best interest finding); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 635 (child 14 or
older); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215 (West Supp. 2012) (child 12 or older, or
younger with a showing of good cause).
235 See, e.g., Letter from Nancy Martinez, Director, Strategic Planning & Policy
Development, to Comm'rs of Social Servs., (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://
www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/policies/extemal/OCFS_2011/INFs/11-OCFS-INF-02%20
Restoration%20ofo 20Parental%20Rights.pdf; CAL. SEN. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL
ANALYSIs, Assemb. Bill 519, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., at 2-3 (2005), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/054)6/bill/asm/ab-0501-0550/ab 519_cfL_20050607 161843
sen-comin.html.
"2 See, e.g., In reJerred H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 485-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(lamenting the "harshness" of a legal orphan's situation and calling upon the state
legislature to address this issue); see also Resolution Calling for Judicial Action to Reduce
the Number of Legal Orphans at Risk of Aging out of Foster Care in the United States, NAT'L
COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.ncjfcj.org/
sites/default/files/ResolutionLegalOrphansfnl-3-21-12.pdf.
237 See, e.g., CAL. SEN. COMM. ONJUDICIARY, supra note 235, at 3 (citing both the
stigma and the fact that legal orphans are entitled to neither parental support nor
inheritance from family members).
2 Letter from Nancy Martinez to Comm'rs of Social Servs., supra note 235, at 2.
[Vol. 17:1150
PARSING PARENTHOOD
have failed to find adoptive homes for many children.' 9 Supporters of
the California legislation argued successfully that the creation of large
numbers of legal orphans not only reflected poorly upon the state's child
welfare system but also "undermine [d] public confidence in judicial de-
terminations.,4 o
These statutes are being offered as the solution to the complex prob-
lems of child maltreatment and permanency. States' eagerness to address
these problems is clear: the reinstatement statutes appear to have en-
joyed broad support from all players in the child welfare system in most
jurisdictions, variously being sponsored or supported by parents' groups,
children's advocates, the state child welfare agency, and the judiciary.
In most states, there was virtually no opposition to the legislation, and in
some, not even any real discussion.4  This silence is possibly due to the
pragmatic realization that such measures are necessary to help children
in foster care, but do not fit in with the dominant child welfare paradigm.
2. Implicit Bias Results in an Unchanged Parenthood Framework
Reinstatement statutes perpetuate the flawed public policy story that
child maltreatment is an individual problem caused by deviant parents.
The focus is not on preventing child maltreatment or on determining
whether these parents are now better able to care for their children, but
rather on whether these children have found or are likely to find anoth-
241
er, "better" family through adoption. One state family court judge
acknowledged this "fall back" notion explicitly: "These children don't
forget their families. They see value in them where we might not. When no
one else has stepped in to establish that parenting relationship, it is just mean not
to remove that legal barrier to restore that family in some form."2 44 Re-
flecting this view, the reinstatement statutes typically require a finding
219 CAL. SEN. COMM. ONJUDICIARY, supra note 235, at 3 (citing a report that, as of
2002, there were 5,846 legally freed children in California not yet placed in adoptive
homes).
240 Children's Law Center of Los Angeles, Addressing the "Legal Orphans" Problem"
PARENTATTORNEY.ORG, http://parentattomey.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/legal-
orphans-proposal.doc.
241 For instance, the New York bill was sponsored by the State Office of Children
and Family Services and supported by the Legal Aid Society (which represents
children in abuse and neglect proceedings) and the parents' bar. Similarly, the
California bill was co-sponsored by the Children's Law Center and the Judicial
Council of California.
122 E-mail from Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Representation Coordinator,
Indigent Def. Servs., N.C., to author (June 20, 2011) (on file with author).
243 Of course many parents whose rights have been terminated are capable of
improving and properly caring for their children, but the focus in the reinstatement
statutes is not so much on this as on the child's status as a legal orphan.
2" Assembly Panel Votes for Parental Rights Bill, LAs VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Apr. 5,
2007, at 3B (emphasis added) (quoting Nevada Family Court judge Gerald
Hardcastle in support of the Nevada reinstatement statute).
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that the child is not likely to be adopted or are frequently limited to
groups of children who are "hard to adopt," such as older children.m
The availability heuristic thus continues to channel all approaches to
maltreatment at punishing and "fixing" parents. Rather than address the
underlying risks and challenges to families that result in child welfare in-
volvement, reinstatement statutes instead purport to distinguish between
the incorrigibly bad parents and the select few bad parents who can be
redeemed. Accordingly, reinstatement is framed as an exceptional meas-
ure for morally worthy families. As a supporter of the proposed Minneso-
ta legislation put it: "l[T] hose [who] . . . deserve to be a reunited family ...
should have a second chance.",2 4 This dialogue perpetuates the stock sto-
ries of good and bad families dominating public discussion of the child
welfare system. In fact, the dichotomy between biological and adoptive
parents is so entrenched in this realm that the new laws are often misun-
derstood and framed in terms of biological parents "adopting" their chil-
dren. Yet none of the statutes or agency guidelines include any specific
indications of what this deserving family would look like or how much
improvement a parent must show in order to earn reinstatement of her
rights. Instead the choice is almost entirely discretionary, rendering deci-
sion-makers particularly susceptible to the stereotypes about "bad" par-
ents in the child welfare system and to other implicit biases such as con-
firmation bias.
This focus on the individual parent's pathology and moral merit is
reflected in the lack of services to help families achieve reinstatement.
Not one of the statutes has services attached. Families being "restored"
need assistance with housing, child care, or substance abuse treatment to
avoid breaking down because of the same poverty-related or other risk
factors which resulted in a termination in the first instance. The lack of
services for parents whose rights are being reinstated contrasts starkly
with the treatment of adoptive families, who are entitled both to services
and financial assistance so that they do not fail. This lack of services ren-
ders reinstatement a hollow promise. Even parents' attorneys may dis-
1 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.215 (West Supp. 2012).
2 Lee Ann Schutz, Reversing Parental Terminations Cals for Caution, MINN. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES PUB. INFO. SERVs. (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.house.leg.state.
mn.us/hinfo/sessiondaily.asp?storyid=2644 (emphasis added).
2o See Leah Hope, Law Lets Woman Adopt Her Own Children, ABC LOCAL (ul. 5,
2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=8232991.
241 Some statutes include common family law terms such as "best interests of the
child" and "changed circumstances" and a few even outline some factors to consider,
but largely the decision remains almost completely discretionary. Accordingly the
availability and success of reinstatement primarily turns on the caseworker. See Email
from Michael Heard, Soc. Servs. Manager, Wash. State Office of Pub. Def., to author
(une 1, 2011) (on file with author); see also OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 73
(discussing this dynamic in the subsidized guardianship context).
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suade some of their more struggling clients from pursuing reinstate-
ment-without the proper supports, it is a set-up for failure.
Furthering the underlying narrative that parents in public family law
are unworthy, they are almost completely excluded from the reinstate-
ment process in numerous states. For instance, only New York allows par-
ents standing to petition for reinstatement. In contrast, the supporters of
the California legislation secured passage of the bill only after emphasiz-
ing that parents would not have access to the reinstatement process, so
that they could not interfere with other permanency planning for their
children, such as adoptions.2so In numerous states, parents do not have
standing as parties to the proceeding or are not entitled to counsel.25 '
This exclusion not only reflects a negative, even biased, view of the par-
ents in these cases, but is also impractical since the parents' exclusion
makes it more difficult for courts and child welfare agencies to adequate-
ly assess the parents' capabilities and the best interests of the children.
As a result, reinstatement is underutilized. No state appears to track
reinstatement cases and there are no published cases to date addressing
252
the merits of a reinstatement petition. Some of this is to be expected
given how new the statutes are, but there are few petitions even in the
2-53
states that have had reinstatement for over six years. Reinstatement is
not being offered to families because caseworkers, lawyers, and others in-
volved in the child welfare system often "pre-screen" arguably appropri-
254
ate cases. Confirmation bias makes this pre-screening a difficult barrier
to overcome. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many case workers and
others working with families in the child welfare system are firmly en-
trenched in the belief that "once a bad parent, always a bad parent."2 5 6
2" Telephone Interview with Jana Heyd, supra note 188.
250 Susan Getman & Steve Christian, Reinstating Parental Rights: Another Path to
Permanency?, 26 PROTECTING CHILDREN, no. 1, 2011, at 58, 65. This threat is quite
unlikely since many of the children in foster care, and, by definition, most of the
children eligible for reinstatement, do not have adoptive prospects. Not surprisingly,
then, there are few to no reported instances of parents interfering with adoptions in
this fashion.
211 Id. at 63.
232 A few courts have discussed the statutes, see, e.g., In reJ.R., 230 P.3d 1087, 1090
(Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (construing the reinstatement statute language), but only one
appears to have applied a reinstatement statute to make findings in a particular case,
see In re Sheila CC v. Comm'r of Soc. Servs. Of Schenectady Cnty., 950 N.Y.S.2d 919,
919 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (affirming dismissal of mother's petition to restore her
parental rights on the grounds that the youngest child had been adopted and the
other two children were not "[14] years of age or older" as required by N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT. § 635(d) (McKinney Supp. 2012)).
2" Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Thornton, Attorney, Am. Bar Ass'n Ctr.
on Children and the Law (July 6, 2011).
254 Telephone Interview with Jana Heyd, supra note 188.
2 Anecdotal evidence is the only available source to date about the
reinstatement process as no study yet appears to exist on this new policy trend.
256 Email from Michael Heard, supra note 248 (also opining that workers are
loathe to use the reinstatement statutes as it constitutes an admission their agency was
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Rather than assess the deeper causes of child maltreatment, workers may
erect barriers to reinstatement out of a stereotype that parents whose
rights have been terminated will never be worthy of parenthood.
The fact that the institutional or, even more problematically, indi-
vidual, players in the child welfare system often remain the same in rein-
statement cases worsens this dynamic. It is difficult for a case worker to
change her attitude towards a parent she had earlier seen as irredeema-
ble:
To get to the point of the termination of parental rights. . . you
need to believe that a parent won't change ... [while] a reinstate-
ment of parents' rights requires that both agency leadership and
social workers need to be open to a new view of the parent and be-
lieve that parents can change."'
And it is not just agency personnel who remain the same: lawyers for the
state, for the child, and even for the parent, as well as judges, are often
repeat players and must be open to returning a child to parents whom
258they may have previously thought incorrigible. Even where the players
are different, the desire for systemic continuity renders a new view of a
case unlikely. As one attorney pointed out: "Many judges are reluctant to
restore rights to someone that another judge has taken them away
from . ... 2"9This confirmation bias makes shifting the narrative as to in-
dividual families very difficult.26o
IV. REMAPPING PUBLIC PARENTHOOD
Parenthood in the public family law sphere must be envisioned in a
different way in order to effectively address child maltreatment and
equally treat all children and families. Tweaking concepts or slight shifts
in policy are not enough to improve the massively dysfunctional child
welfare system and bridge the private and public concepts of parenthood.
Only with an alternative vision will the dialogue move to more effective
alternatives. Until the legal system begins to consider parenthood and
mistaken about the parent). Lawyers and child welfare personnel in other states echo
this problem. See Kendra Hurley, When You Can't Go Home, 15 CHILD WELFARE WATCH
18, 20 (2008) (discussing the views of child welfare workers).
257 Getman & Christian, supra note 250, at 66.
" One children's attorney described a reinstatement case as being particularly
difficult for precisely this reason: the state agency attorney was the same one who had
represented the state in the termination of the parent's rights and was very loathe to
change her view of the parent.
. Hope, supra note 247.
" See Burke, supra note 19, at 1606 (discussing the analogous situation of
prosecutors' confirmation bias resulting in a reluctance to reverse charging decisions
or otherwise change their views about a particular case).
261 See Blasi, supra note 132, at 920 (noting that policy makers must be offered
"alternative visions" in order to approach problems in a new way). Alternative visions
are certainly possible. Although a thorough comparative analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is worth noting that most European countries do not address child
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child maltreatment differently, implicit cognitive biases will prohibit
meaningful change in the child welfare arena.
On the macro level, a new cognitive narrative can serve as the base-
262line for more realistic and effective legislation in this realm. The de-
fault should change-rather than assuming parents are bad and irre-
deemable, the legal framework should posit parents as supportable
resources for their children. Relying on the empirical evidence about risk
factors and effective prevention and treatment, rather than cognitive
shortcuts about certain categories of parents, will lead to better child wel-
261fare policies. Such a shift can also lead to changed behavior by deci-
sion-makers in the system. Although alleviating the implicit cognitive bi-
ases of key decision-makers is not easy, studies show that implicit
cognitive processes may be controllable.6 Awareness of these implicit bi-
265
ases is a significant first step. Broadening information streams, follow-
ing an objective framework, and building in outside assessments for a
"fresh" look at cases can also help to shift the dialogue on a more micro
266level. A recent pilot project to address implicit bias among family court
judges indicates that such approaches can be effective at reunifying chil-
dren and their parents and perhaps at reducing the overrepresentation
267
of children of color in the foster care system.
maltreatment as we do. For instance, European countries terminate rights much less
frequently than our system does, and countries including Belgium, the Netherlands
and Germany address it preventively using home health visitors and parent
education. See Sankaran, supra note 46, at 295-96.
262 See van Ryn & Fu, supra note 121, at 252 (concluding that exploration of the
ways in which implicit social cognition impacts health care delivery is essential to any
reform in this realm).
2 For instance, a major impediment to implementing subsidized guardianship
in an effective way for more families is the cultural value placed upon adoption in the
child welfare public policy story. To this end, caseworkers, potential guardians,
attorneys, judges and others working with families in the child welfare system need to
be properly informed about the pros and cons of each option and to understand the
permanency potential of each.
" Margo J. Monteith & Corrine I. Voils, Exerting Control over Prejudiced Responses,
in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE PRINCETON SYMPOSIUM ON THE LEGACY AND
FUTURE OF SOCIAL COGNITION 375 (Gordon B. Moskowitz ed., 2001); see also Burke,
supra note 19, at 1616-18 (arguing for training of prosecutors to overcome confirmation
and other implicit cognitive biases in their decision-making); van Ryn & Fu, supra
note 121, at 252.
2 SeeJeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Tial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1195, 1203 (2009).
2 Id. at 1230-31 (recommending audits ofjudicial decision-making and increased
use of three-judge panels at the trial court level to mitigate bias of a sole decision-
maker); see also Burke, supra note 19, at 1616-21 (making similar training
recommendations for prosecutors to overcome confirmation and other implicit
cognitive biases).
267 See Irene Sullivan, Juvenile judges Find Benchcards Helpful in Reuniting Families,
YOUTH TODAY (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.youthtoday.org/viewblog.cfm?blog-
id=518 (outlining a 45% increase in the number of children returned home in a pilot
project to "attack implicit bias" where juvenile judges used a checklist developed by
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Legal scholars have proposed various approaches to the child welfare
system. For instance, Clare Huntington has suggested moving away from
268
a rights-based approach to a problem-solving framework. Marsha Garri-
son and Annette Appell have posited a preventive, public health ap-
proach to child welfare." Martin Guggenheim incorporates both points,
arguing for a preventive approach to help families before they are in cri-
sis and for an understanding of children's rights as intrinsically embed-
ded with those of the adults in their lives, particularly their parents.2 0 In
this section, I aim to build on these perspectives by positing a preventive
approach to child maltreatment and a remapping of the parent-child re-
lationship for families who have been separated because of child mal-
treatment, drawing both from public health and private family law ap-
proaches. This framework should inform state policy at all points of
intervention: before, during, and after involvement in the child welfare
system.2 1 Although I offer no quick "fixes" to this complex problem, for I
think no real fix can come until the public policy story changes, I will flag
some promising child welfare initiatives which signal the potential for a
new story.
A. Considerations
1. Recognizing Child Maltreatment as a Social Problem
Shifting the focus from individual bad parents to the environmental
factors underlying child maltreatment is essential to any effective effort to
reduce child maltreatment. The data is clear that the risk factors for most
child maltreatment have more to do with contextual, environmental
conditions such as poverty, than with the individual characteristics or
choices of parents. To this end, the legal framework should be in-
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges); NAT'L COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTJUDGEs, RIGHT FROM THE START: THE CCC PRELIMINARY
PROTECTIVE HEARING BENCHCARD 9-10 (2010), available at http://www.ncjfcj.
org/sites/default/files/Right%20from%20the%20Start 1.pdf (outlining "reflection
questions" which can allow judges to "acknowledge [their] 'implicit bias[es]' and to
become more conscious about potential influences on their decision-making
process").
268 See Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1485 (2007) (suggesting refraining the family-state relationship as one of mutual
dependency in order to accomplish better outcomes in child welfare policy).
269 Garrison, supra note 17, at 599; Appell, supra note 95, at 298 (each suggesting
a public health framework for addressing child maltreatment).
276 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 174-81
(2005).
271 Ultimately, the ASFA statutory framework should be replaced by a more
effective approach to child maltreatment and permanency, based on prevention of
proven risk factors rather than post hoc and stigmatized intervention and the rush to
terminate parental rights. Until then, however, a new conception of parenthood can
inform state policies and practices even within the ASFA framework.
272 See supra Part I.B.2.a. A small percentage of child maltreatment, such as some
of the sexual and physical abuse cases, may be very difficult to predict or prevent, but
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formed by the approach to child maltreatment in other disciplines. For
instance, the medical community has expressly identified child mal-
273treatment as a preventable public health problem. This approach, en-
dorsed by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the American Psycho-
logical Association, and other non-legal actors, offers valuable insights for
crafting effective child welfare interventions.
A public health framework focuses on a neutral and empirically-
based assessment of the risk factors for child maltreatment and seeks out
interdisciplinary strategies, recognizing that child maltreatment is a
complex issue requiring multiple areas of expertise." This entails first
defining child maltreatment to focus on measurable and real risk of
harm to children, rather than subjective judgments about parenting be-
haviors. A narrow definition of child maltreatment will lead to more ef-
fective and legitimate state interventions.
Moreover, rather than look at the problem one parent or family at a
time, a public health approach assesses it from a "population" or corn-
munity-wide perspective.2" Interventions could include anti-poverty
measures, programs specifically designed to prevent child maltreatment
and strengthen families, or ideally both.7 Programs should aim to facili-
tate social change and to help families at risk, rather than intervene after
the fact and blame or punish individual parents. Such an approach is in-
creasingly used to address a variety of social problems previously deemed
to be the province of individual deviance, such as smoking, nutrition and
2781both family and community violence.
most maltreatment cases entail well documented risk factors that can be targeted by
prevention programs. See, e.g., APA, supra note 8, at 7, 8 tbl.1.
1 See, e.g., Promoting Safe, Stable and Nurturing Relationships: A Strategic Direction for
Child Maltreatment Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/CM StrategicDirection-OnePager-a.pdf
(defining child maltreatment as a "significant public health problem" in the U.S.).
1 See, e.g., W. Rodney Hammond, Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Public
Health and Child Maltreatment Prevention: The Role of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 8 CHILD MALTREATMENT 81 (2003); APA, supra note 8, at 5 (defining child
maltreatment as a "serious but potentially preventable public health problem").
27$ See Hammond, supra note 274, at 82.
276 See Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Public
Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1649 (2011) (noting that
population health is "shaped powerfully" by the social determinants of health
including race, income and behaviors); Wilson, supra note 39, at 282 n.156 (noting
that public health interventions assess the prevailing conditions underlying illness or
injury).
27 Because poverty is a demonstrated risk factor for child maltreatment, see supra
Part I.B.2.a, support for poor families and anti-poverty programs will also address
child maltreatment. Garrison, supra note 17, at 612.
278 See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 274, at 81. For a recent argument for the
application of a public health framework to a "legal" problem, see generally Jonathan
Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law Approach to Human
Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REv. 447 (2011).
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A preventive approach has numerous advantages both for individual
families and for societies. First, preventing child maltreatment can avoid
the traumatic and costly impact of maltreatment on children.7 Support-
ing families before they are in crisis would also entail fewer family disrup-
tions and the concomitant harms of children's removal to the foster care
system.2 o Second, a preventive approach reduces the stigma and likeli-
hood of bias so endemic to our current system. Third, such an approach
would cost less than the current post hoc reliance on foster care, adop-
2881
tion, and the court system.
One preventive approach with significant potential is home visit-
282ing. Home visiting programs can vary widely but usually entail a nurse
or other professional visiting new mothers or other at-risk parents regu-
larly and helping them learn parenting skills. Some have proven very suc-
cessful at reducing child maltreatment in a cost-efficient fashion; one
program, the Nurse-Family Partnership, has been found to reduce child
maltreatment by 79% among a high-risk population.8  It also greatly re-
duced related social problems including school failure and juvenile de-
linquency.8 Its potential to reach and support at-risk families has led
home visiting to be endorsed by scholars at both ends of the child welfare
spectrum, i.e. those who are more family preservation oriented and those
2851
who are more adoption oriented.
279 See supra notes 79-88, 91 and accompanying text.
280 id.
2m See Huntington, supra note 268, at 1518-19. Currently, states spend billions of
dollars on foster care and adoptions, not even counting the costs of maltreatment
and the legal system, dwarfing the spending on preventive services. Per the latter,
states spent only $250 million total on home visiting programs in 2008. See KAY
JOHNSON, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, STATE-BASED HOME VISITING:
STRENGTHENING PROGRAMS THROUGH STATE LEADERSHIP 4 (2009), available at
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_862.pdf.
. Current programs could also be reconfigured to work in a preventive fashion.
For instance, subsidized guardianship could be used as a preventive measure to avoid
removing children into foster care. A few states do use it in this way currently and
some advocates have recommended broadening this preventive use. See Eliza Patten,
The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child Welfare Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 237, 237 (2004).
2.. David Olds et al., Prenatal and Early Childhood Nurse Home Visitation, Juv. JusT.
BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice), Nov. 1998, at 3, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/172875.pdf.
284 See id. at 3, 5.
28' See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 15, at 165 (noting the promise of such
programs with the caveat that they should include a supervision piece in order to be
most effective at protecting children); Huntington, supra note 268, at 1531-33
(endorsing the effectiveness of programs like the Nurse-Family Partnership). The
controversy over the Obama Administration's 2010 budget earmark for additional
funding for nurse home-visiting as a cost-effective family support illustrates the flawed
parenthood framework again. Some Republicans derided the program as "billions for
babysitters." Cheryl Wetzstein, Obama Plan Funds Nurse Visits to New Moms, WASH.
TIMES (D.C.),Jan. 12, 2010, at Al.
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In addition to being preventive, the most effective child maltreat-
ment interventions are holistic, looking at children and parents within
the context of their families and communities. Such an approach allows
for an assessment of a family's needs as well as its strengths, and it recog-
nizes the impact of context on child maltreatment. Accordingly, rather
than aiming to "fix the parent"m28 the system would aim to support the
family so that the child could be raised safely by loving adults. This ap-
proach not only reduces the likelihood of bias, because it avoids blame in
favor of forward-looking solutions, but is also more individualized. Dif-
ferentiating among the various risk factors or treatment needs of families
is much more effective than the current "cookie cutter" service plans
parents must meet for reunification.2 8 ' This holistic view works well with a
preventive approach, as both focus on the larger communal or social
context of child maltreatment rather than on the punishment of individ-
uals.
A holistic approach to child welfare interventions also comports with
current mental health approaches to families, such as "family systems"
theory. Family systems theory posits that an individual cannot be un-
derstood, or effectively treated, outside of the context of his or her family
and personal relationships.8 0 It recognizes the interdependence and
emotional connectedness of families, even where members are in conflict
or live apart. Moreover, a family systems approach eschews blaming just
one individual for a particular problem, looking instead at the complex
interaction of environment and risk factors giving rise to a particular sit-
uation.2 o
The use of family group decision-making structures is one promising
sign of a more holistic approach to child maltreatment. Family group
conferencing engages the extended family, often including friends and
other community members who are not blood relatives, in problem-
solving to address risks to child safety.292 This model can be used both
preventively for cases not yet in the court system and to divert cases at-
2" See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577, 605 (1997) (discussing the focus
of the child welfare system on fixing and punishing individual parents).
107 See Clare Huntington, Missing Parents, 42 FAM. L.Q. 131, 140 (2008)
(suggesting a problem-solving model in child welfare which would "differentiate
among cases," thereby providing more effective assistance to parents).
28 Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems Paradigm for Legal Decision Making Affecting
Child Custody, 6 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 (1996).
" Id. at 4.
29o Id. at 5.
2' See, e.g., Pat McElroy & Cynthia Goodsoe [sic], Family Group Decision Making
Offers Alternative Approach to Child Welfare, YOUTH L. NEWS, May-June 1998, at 1.
22 See Huntington, supra note 16, at 678-80 (detailing family group conferencing
(FGC)).
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ready being adjudicated." This model engages the family in addressing
its own challenges, thereby identifying strengths and mobilizing previous-
ly unrecognized resources, and eschewing blame in favor of formulating
194
solutions for the child care. Such programs are being used in some
communities and show potential to prevent further child maltreatment
while also reducing court involvement and intervention in the family. 95
There is also some evidence that the use of family group decision-making
can reduce racial disparities in the child welfare system, perhaps because
the intensive process helps decision-makers to assess cases based on indi-
vidual characteristics rather than stereotypes.9 Finally, family group de-
cision-making engages parents in the process, helping to overcome some
of the internalized self-blame and low self-worth that impede many par-
297
ents from changing.
2. Expanding Our Concepts ofPernanency and Parenthood
Shifting the narrative on child maltreatment also requires expanding
our notions of permanency and parenthood. To this end, we can be in-
formed by the parsing out of parenthood in private family law and by da-
ta on the myriad ways in which parents and children are connected.
Permanency in the legal system has been connected to an idealized fami-
ly structure, synonymous with adoption under ASFA. Relatedly, parents
who are flawed or unable to care for their children have been designated
non-parents, with no residual rights or connections to their children.
This framework is both starkly different from the reality of children's and
parents' experiences, and fundamentally misguided as a normative policy
matter.
The current concept of permanency in public family law is much too
narrow. A legalistic notion of permanency, limited to birth or adoptive
parents, is prioritized over the psychological understanding of perma-
nency as "an enduring relationship that arises out of feelings of belong-
ingness. The former definition of permanency underlies the rule-out
provisions of most subsidized guardianship programs and the similar re-
quirement in reinstatement statutes that the child be deemed unlikely to
be adopted.
This framework, however, overestimates the legal permanency of
adoption and undervalues children's views. Adoptive placements disrupt
2' Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannucci, Family Group Conferences:
Transforming Traditional Child Welfare Policy and Practice, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 216, 217
(2004).
2' See Huntington, supra note 16, at 678-79.
29 See id. at 680-85; Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 293, at 218.
29 Allen & Davis-Pratt, supra note 213, at 77.
' See Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 293, at 219.
" Testa, supra note 197, at 499.
2 See supra Part 1II.A.1. Judges in child maltreatment cases also prioritize this




and adoption fails at not insignificant rates. Studies have consistently
found that adoptions disrupt (the placement fails before the adoption is
legally finalized) at rates of 10 to 25%.300 And adoptions dissolve or fail
after they are finalized at rates of 3 to 15%.o1 (This statistic is likely an
underestimate as name changes and other correlations to adoption make
tracking dissolutions very difficult) . In fact, adoption failure rates are
comparable to those of subsidized guardianships where the subsidy rates
313
are the same.
Such disruptions can be devastating to the children involved, all the
more so because they were often promised that adoptions were always
and absolutely final.o The frequency of failure, particularly among older
children, has led many youth to become skeptical about adoption as
permanent; they recognize that it "is not a cure-all," and brings its own
problems.0 o As one young woman put it:
I didn't wanna be adopted because I knew that [it] wouldn't benefit
me.... I definitely wanted the relationship. [But] to me being
adopted doesn't necessarily mean you're gonna have a good rela-
tionship.... It's just a paper that says you belong to someone....
[W] hat's on paper isn't what's important to me.
A psychological definition of permanency would reflect how chil-
dren themselves view their home and family, which is important, since
children are the intended recipients of permanency under ASFA. Chil-
3"0 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ADOPTION DISRUPTION AND DisSoLUTION:
NUMBERS AND TRENDS 2 (2012), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s-disrup.pdf.
3' Id. at 6; see also Susan Scarf Merrell, Adoption's Dirty Secret, DAILY BEAST,
(Apr. 17, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/04/17/adoptions-dirty-
secret.html.
302 This has led parents' advocates and others to call for a comprehensive study of
adoption failure. Posting of David Lansner, dlansner@lanskub.com, to child-
parentsattomeys@mail.americanbar.org (July 11, 2011) (on file with author); see also
Dawn J. Post & Brian Zimmerman, The Revolving Doors of Family Court: Confronting
Broken Adoptions, 40 CAP. U. L. REv. 437 (2012) (outlining the under-documented
problem of failed adoptions from the foster care system).
3 See supra Part II.A.1.
See, e.g., Meribah Knight, Failed Adoptions Create More Homeless Youths, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A19 (telling the story of one youth who was devastated when
his adoptive mother of 12 years abandoned him at age 17, shortly before the end of
her subsidy for his care); see also OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 96 (quoting one
youth who was adopted twice out of foster care: "Kind of weird. It's not that
permanent. I didn't even know that could happen [that it could end].").
30 Natasha Santos & Pauline Gordon, Teens [sic] Feelings Must Be Safeguarded
During the Adoption Process, REPRESENT, May/June 2004, reprinted in CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF Soc. POLICY & URBAN INST., INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 46 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/1001351_safe_families-act.pdf.
m Gina Miranda Samuels, Ambiguous Loss of Home: The Experience of Familial
(Im)permanence Among Young Adults with Foster Care Backgrounds, 31 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVICES REv. 1229, 1234 (2009) (first and second alterations and first omission in
original).
2013] 161
LEWIS & CIARK LAW REVIEW
dren think of permanency not as defined by law, but in terms of relation-
ships, including feeling "safe" and loved, and being treated with ac-
ceptance, trust, and respect.30o Under this psychological definition of
permanency, studies show there is no difference between children being
adopted or children being cared for by a guardian."" Nor is there a dif-
ference for their caregivers; sometimes guardians were not even aware of
the legal distinctions between guardianship and adoption, but were
committed to providing a permanent home and the children in their
care felt it.309 Reframing permanency in psychological rather than legal
terms would also increase the number of children exiting foster care to
stable and lasting homes since families would have a broader array of op-
tions to choose from.3 0 Finally, an expanded understanding of perma-
nency would acknowledge a greater diversity of family forms, especially
the extended family and cooperative caregiving historically common in
African-American and Native American communities.
Parenthood in the public realm similarly requires remapping in or-
der to recognize the influence of key adults in children's lives and equal-
ly respect all family forms. As outlined earlier, children's relationships
with parents and caregivers are not all or nothing. 12 On the contrary,
they are complex, nuanced and inclusive. Children value and continue to
engage in relationships with their biological parents even when they are
in other secure living arrangements, despite the lack of any legal frame-
work to accommodate these relationships.1 In sum, forcing a choice be-
tween "old" biological parents and "new" adoptive parents neither re-
flects reality nor furthers children's interests.
Recognition of a network of adults important to a child should re-
place this false dichotomy: an expanded vision of parenthood would re-
flect the continuum of adults with whom children in the child welfare
system have relationships.1 4 To this end, the role of both birth parents
and custodians or caregivers should be recognized. Numerous scholars
have called for an expanded understanding of parenthood and greater
0 OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 95-96. For many young people, subsidized
guardianship seems more "normal" than adoption, in large part because they do not
have to sever ties with their biological parents and take on "new" parents. Id. at 95.
See Testa, supra note 197, at 525.
a Bissell & Kirana, supra note 209, at 16.
310 See Testa, supra note 197, at 533 (showing an increase in permanency when
caregivers were offered a choice between adoption and subsidized guardianship).
" See Susan L. Brooks, The Case for Adoption Alternatives, 39 FAM. CT. REv. 43, 44
(2001); Schwartz, supra note 110, at 456; OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at 34.
"' See supra Part I.B.2.b.
3 See Samuels, supra note 306, at 1229, 1233-37.
.14 Similarly, kin should be broadly defined for purposes of subsidized




disaggregation of rights in the private family law realm. 1 5 These sugges-
tions are often based upon a functional definition of parenthood, and a
desire to recognize caregivers beyond biological parents.316 I support
these arguments but I am, in a sense, making the inverse argument: that
even where biological parents are not a child's caregivers, children still
usually desire and benefit from contact with them and should be allowed
this contact. This is particularly true for older children who have had
more previous contact with or memories of a parent, but also true for
children who may not know their biological parents very well.' Moving
beyond a narrow conception of parenthood to recognize the multiple
adults present in the lives of many children in foster care will lead to bet-
ter policies, particularly for older youth.
Given this, parental contact and rights should be completely termi-
nated only in the rarest of circumstances, and the default should shift to
favor contact even when children are in other homes, whether they be
foster homes, adoptive homes, or other custodial arrangements.m9 Visita-
tion between parents and children in the child welfare system should be
prioritized, even after the child is in another seemingly permanent living
situation, rather than doled out sparingly and under unfavorable condi-
tions.
Equally significantly, parental rights should be parsed out in the pub-
lic law context as they are in the private law context."O For instance, par-
ents should still retain rights to involvement in decisions about their
children even when their children are removed from their care. Alt-
hough parents of children in foster care sometimes retain educational
and medical decision-making powers in theory, this often is not en
so See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879 (1984); see alsojacobs, supra note 18, at 313 (advocating for recognition of more
than two parents in more cases).
316 In fact, these arguments underlie a recent California proposed state statute
allowing for more than two legal parents. S.B. 1476, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2012). The bill passed under both the Senate and the State Assembly, but was
ultimately vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown in September. Id.; jery Brown Vetoes Bill
Allowing More than Two Parents, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2012), http://blogs.
sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2012/09/jerry-brown-vetoes-bill-allowingmore-than-two-
parents.html. The bill arose in response to a case where a child was placed in foster
care because her biological father, the adult who was willing and able to care for her,
would have been her third legal parent. California Bill Would Allow Children to Have
More than Two Parents, NBC NEWS (July 3, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/
2012/07/03/12543099-califomia-bill-would-allow-children-to-have-more-than-two-parents.
311 See supra Part I.B.1.b.
318 See FREUNDLICH, supra note 102, at 19.
319 As noted earlier, most European systems terminate parental rights far less
frequently than the American system. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
320 See Parkinson, supra note 38, at 247 (discussing the move towards parenting
plans and parenting time rather than more rigid custody arrangements).
s21 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7579(a) (2012) (allowing for a limitation of the
educational rights of children in foster care separately from the limitation of other
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322
couraged or even permitted in practice. Parental rights do not have to
be equally parsed out; rather, they could be disaggregated at various lev-
els depending upon the roles and capabilities of the adults involved.
An "additive, rather than substitutive"324 framework of parenthood
would bring the vision of parenthood into line with the reality of families
and relationships and treat all families equally. Most families do not con-
form to the dyadic parental model which dominates our socio-legal sys-
tem, and children in foster care are, obviously, particularly far from this
norm. Similarly to an expanded notion of permanency, such atframework
would incorporate children's visions of their relationships with parents
and other adults, according respect to their attachments and to all adults
in relationships with children. An expanded recognition of parenthood
would also ameliorate the problematic expressive effects of ASFA and re-
lated laws which render flawed parents to be non-parents. 32 By bringing
the necessary flexibility to respond to the needs and attachments of each
individual child and family, the framework would embrace a multiplicity
of family forms, rather than stigmatizing or ignoring those who depart
from the normative ideal.
This expanded vision of permanency and parenthood would reduce
the myopic focus on adoption and permit a range of equally valued cus-
todial options, including subsidized guardianship and other less formal-
ized arrangements.m It would also recognize and support the parent-
child relationship even where parents are not able to care for their chil-
dren. There are some signs for guarded optimism about such a shift in
vision. For instance, the recent Fostering Connections Act allows states to
fund subsidized guardianship and provides for "family connection
grants" to states for youth aging out of foster care to be in touch with
rights); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 200.5 (2012) (granting parents
education rights in some circumstances even when children are in foster care).
122 See Ryznar & Park, supra note 93, at 163-64.
2 See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 334-35 (suggesting a framework with various
levels of rights). This framework is permissible under the ALI Recommendations as
well. Id. at 333-34.
2 See Sacha M. Coupet, "Ain't I a Parent?": The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from
the Debate Over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 595, 635
(2010).
321 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 11, 58
(2008) (recognizing that the expressive value of the term parent leads many kinship
caregivers to forego adoption for guardianship so that the original parent continues
to be recognized).
2' These could include subsidized guardianship and open adoption. See Brooks,
supra note 311, at 44; Schwartz, supra note 110, at 443 (advocating subsidized
guardianship); ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. & CASEY FAMILY SERVS., SUBSIDIZED
GUARDIANSHIP: COLLABORATING TO IDENTIFY NEW POLICY OPPORTUNITIES 1-2
(2006) (on file with editor) (identifying a range of legally permanent options for




their extended families.327 Nonetheless, as I have pointed out, guardian-
ship is still not funded to the same degree as adoption and most states
still do not mandate such connections, nor carry them out in practice.
More interestingly, some child welfare agencies are exploring new
ways for youth to achieve permanency, including finding adults to serve
as role models or connections for youth, even if they are not custodial re-
sources.3 11 It would be preferable for all youth to have a family setting to
live in, but recognizing the importance of even non-custodial adult sup-
port is an important step beyond the adoption hegemony. Finally, some
agencies are also exploring ways to balance the youth's old and new fami-
ly connections, such as open adoption.31 Enabling youth to maintain
both their old and new families, including parents, siblings and other
relatives, increases the number of youth willing to be adopted and re-
flects the reality of many family structures.3 o
B. Concerns
A new approach to public parenthood and child maltreatment is not
without potential drawbacks. Below I will address some criticisms this
paradigm shift may raise: that it invades family autonomy, that it stigma-
tizes certain types of families and that it would be overly costly or politi-
cally unviable. I will also address concerns about the instability of redefin-
ing permanence and the boundaries of an expanded notion of
parenthood.
A more preventive or holistic approach to child maltreatment is
sometimes criticized as an impermissible invasion of family autonomy.
As noted above, parents are accorded strong rights to raise their children
and state intervention in that regard may be deemed an impermissible
autonomy violation. However, this is not a drawback to a preventive ap-
2 Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-351, sec. 102, § 427, 122 Stat. 3949, 3953-54.
"2 See Alice Bussiere, Permanence for Older Foster Youth, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 231
(2006) (outlining different innovations California is making in this regard).
" See FREUNDLICH, supra note 102, at 20.
3 See Bussiere, supra note 328, at 238-39; see alsoJennifer Macomber, The Impact
of ASFA on the Permanency and Independence for Youth in Foster Care, in CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF Soc. POLICY & URBAN INST., INTENTIONS AND RESULTs: A LoOK BACK AT THE
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 83, 88 (2009), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/1001351 safefamiliesact.pdf (recommending further exploration of
open adoption as an option for older youth in foster care).
Opponents of more holistic approaches to child maltreatment have raised
related concerns that family group conferencing and similar mechanisms may
infringe upon parental autonomy via due process violations. See Huntington, supra
note 16, at 685-86. Scholars have raised particular concerns about these methods
when mothers are victims of domestic violence. Family group conferencing, however,
is successfully used in such cases in many countries, including New Zealand. Id. In
contrast, many American jurisdictions exclude cases involving domestic violence or
more severe abuse. See Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 293, at 222-23.
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proach to child maltreatment for several reasons. First, as scholars have
pointed out, the line between state intervention and autonomy is a false
one, and in fact the state intervenes all of the time to shape, support, or
otherwise direct families.3 " This is certainly true of parents who become
involved in the child welfare system, whose conduct is excessively scruti-
nized after the initial contact.sn The key question is when and how the
state intervenes. A preventive approach would not increase state interven-
tion in the lives of at-risk families. Instead, it would move the point of in-
tervention to be less punitive and more effective.
Moreover, a preventive public health approach is often voluntary,
and this is likely the best starting approach." Thus, for instance, success-
ful home nurse visiting programs have usually been voluntary. Public ed-
ucation can encourage participation, particularly in high-risk communi-
ties, and experience demonstrates that individuals are willing to seek or
accept help when it is offered in a non-stigmatizing and non-punitive way.
Preventive programs, especially if they are broadly offered, signal that it is
335
acceptable to ask for help in parenting.
A second possible critique of preventive approaches is that if offered
to only certain communities, they will stigmatize certain kinds of families.
The fact that parents in the child welfare system are already overwhelm-
ingly marginalized by race and class undercuts this argument. As I have
argued in this Article, the child welfare system is already stigmatizing cer-
tain kinds of families, resulting in a two-tiered parenthood system.
Ideally, a preventive program would be universal to avoid any further
stigma. But even if that is economically or politically unfeasible, 3 a pub-
332 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 268, at 1489. The state intervenes in families
in ways even more invasive than family law, such as criminal law. See I. Bennett Capers,
Home Is Where the Crime Is, 109 MICH. L. REv. 979 (2011) (book review) (outlining the
fact that criminal law has always invaded the home, particularly in the case of non-
normative families).
. See supra Part 1.B.2.a.
3 See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of
Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 94 (1999) (noting that
successful public health programs usually involve voluntary compliance); see also
Elizabeth Bartholet, Race & Child Welfare: Disproportionality, Dispaity, Discrimination:
Re-Assessing the Facts, Re-Thinking the Policy Options, HARVARD L. SCH. 9 (JUL. 2011),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/cap-conferences/rd-conference/rd-
conference-papers/rdconceptpaper-final.pdf (noting that voluntary early intervention
programs are disproportionately used by African-American families, who are among
the most low-income families, and that these services provide the most benefit for the
most disadvantaged families).
3 See Wilson, supra note 39, at 311 (noting that divorcing couples who were
offered parent education programs often subsequently sought out other supports
since seeking help had been normalized); see also Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks
Out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21 J.L. & POL'Y 5 (2012) (pointing out the dangers
of using risk-assessments to make decisions in individual child welfare cases).
"3 A universal program may in fact be more politically feasible given it would
not be seen as a "handout" to low-income people. See Ron Haskins et al., Social
Science Rising: A Tale of Evidence Shaping Public Policy, FUTURE OF CHILDREN 6 (Fall
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lic health approach to child maltreatment would still be far less stigmatiz-
ing than the current system. A public health approach is, by definition,
community-wide in scope and based on objective risk factors rather than
judgment about an individual parent's conduct without recognition of
the environmental factors underlying much parenting behavior. I am not
arguing that parents should be individually investigated for child mal-
treatment based on their inclusion in an at-risk category.3 A risk-based
approach is not an appropriate rubric for dealing with individual cases of
misconduct; it works from a preventive standpoint only. Instead, the data
on risks for child maltreatment can be used to target scarce resources
and focus the provision of services. Finally, as scholars have pointed out,
some trade-off between a preventive approach to social problems such as
child maltreatment and a level of group categorization by risk factors is
inevitable.3" The same approach is being taken to other public health is-
sues, such as smoking and obesity. Child maltreatment should be no dif-
ferent.
Perhaps the most salient criticism of preventive child maltreatment
programs is that they are politically unviable. Some argue this is so be-
cause of their costs. Although preventive programs require resources,
they are undoubtedly less costly than the child welfare system, particular-
ly a system that proposes terminating and then reinstating parental rights
after children have been in foster care for years."' Even more significant-
ly, preventing even a small measure of child maltreatment will result in
significant cost savings in the long term, as child maltreatment brings
with it great social costs.34 0 The more convincing argument is that the
American ethos of self-sufficiency, the same ethos that helps shape the
narrative of bad parent, means that preventive programs will be seen as
anti-poverty programs and thus not popular.
2009), http://www.futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/19-
02_PolicyBrief.pdf.
7 See Wilson, supra note 39, at 320 (similarly arguing for the use of risk-based
factors for sex abuse, including divorced parents, to be used to formulate prevention
efforts, but not to allocate custody in an individual case).
8 See id. at 321.
9 See Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 293, at 222 (noting that the family
group conferencing programs either save costs or add no new costs to the child
welfare system); APA, supra note 8, at 16 (outlining the cost-effectiveness of child
maltreatment prevention programs, and citing one program that cost only $12.74 per
child and another preventive program that resulted in savings of $5.07 for every
dollar invested); Olds et al., supra note 283, at 5 (noting that the nurse-family
partnership home visiting program cost between $2,800 and $3,200 per family in
1998, which is less than the over $5,000 cost of foster care per child, even in today's
dollars).
mo See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
4' See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 15, at 238-39 ("Sadly. . . we can ... predict
that our society will continue to scrimp on the support services that it makes available
to poor people, including those at risk for child maltreatment.").
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This ethos remains a formidable barrier to changing our approach
to child maltreatment. However, several factors make now a potentially
promising time to shift the paradigm. First, there is a growing recogni-
tion that ASFA has created new problems, such as the large number of
legal orphans, and that its successes have come at great cost to many
children and to society as a whole.4 A clear indication of an acknowl-
edgement that ASFA's framework is flawed is the rush by states to enact
reinstatement statutes,4 which are both inefficient and contradictory to
ASFA's mandate. Second, there has been heightened public attention re-
cently to the strains the failing economy has put on children and fami-
lies.4 Third, the increasing shift in other fields, such as medicine and
public health, to a view of child maltreatment as a preventable social
problem can be a valuable source of input and collaboration for policy-
makers.345 Finally, even if it is true that adequate funding of supports for
families, particularly low-income families, is still not politically feasible,
discussion of the flawed child welfare public policy story can at least bring
transparency. Knowledge about the embedded biases and mistaken as-
sumptions underlying the system help in the assessment of new policy
trends such as subsidized guardianship and reinstatement of parental
rights.
Critics of expanded permanency and parenthood frameworks raise
two main points: that reliance on arrangements other than adoption
leaves children too vulnerable to challenges by birth parents or other
forms of disruption, and that parsing out parenthood rights blurs the
347boundaries to an unworkable degree. The first criticism exaggerates
the vulnerability of guardianships to legal challenge because, in fact, bio-
348logical parents rarely challenge guardianships. If they do, they must
349demonstrate the high standard of changed circumstances. In any event,
such concerns can be addressed by structuring guardianships to be more
secure against such challenges. For instance, certain states, including
New Jersey and North Carolina, have amended their statutes to make it
' See, e.g., Allen & Davis-Pratt, supra note 213.
" See supra Part IV.B.1.
' See, e.g., Cristina Silva, Study: 1 in 5 American Children Lives in Poverty, NBC
NEWs (Sep. 22, 2012), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44171347/ns/us-news-life/t/
study-american-children-lives-poverty/#.UHJSCIFAW7s.
345 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
346 The most pragmatic approach would be for the government to fund a variety
of demonstration programs and assess their effectiveness. Home nurse visiting and
family group conferencing are two promising areas which are being funded to some
degree, and which can open the way for funding of other effective prevention
programs.
3 See Patten, supra note 282, at 255, 270; Schwartz, supra note 110, at 462.
m See Patten, supra note 282, at 261.
3 See, e.g., State ex rel.Johnson v Bail, 938 P.2d 209, 212, 214 (Or. 1997).
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more difficult to overturn guardianships."o Most significantly, this view-
point obscures the reality that any parent, adoptive or otherwise, is vul-
nerable to third party custody suits and that no family setting is ever truly
permanent-any parent-child arrangement is open to legal challenge,
and death, divorce, and other traumatic events unfortunately reshape
351families all the time.
Fears about a more nuanced public parenthood framework are also
unwarranted. First, the data clearly show that parents and children aging
out of foster care or in other permanent homes are often already in con-
tact.3 52 Adapting the legal framework to reflect this reality would simply
make such contact simpler and more transparent. Second, although such
a disaggregation of rights is more complicated than the current all-or-
nothing framework, it has existed for some time in the private family law
sector. Courts in custody matters routinely parse out parental rights and
responsibilities such as decision-making powers, joint physical custody
and visitation.5 The ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, for instance,
posit a framework where a biological parent may not be a legal parent
but has parental rights and responsibilities pursuant to an agreement
with the legal parent(s).3 5 4
The same division of responsibilities among multiple parental figures
could occur in families involved with the child welfare system.f In fact,
this recognition of multiple parental figures occurs already for some fam-
ilies involved in the child welfare system, as a child may be placed in the
custody of one set of adults, while another retains decision-making pow-
ers over her. Some families also practice cooperative parenting, sharing
responsibilities among the biological parents and other caregivers, usual-
356
ly in kinship foster care or subsidized guardianship cases.
a ALLEN & BISSELL, supra note 203, at 6; Overview, in USING SUBSIDIZED
GUARDIANSHIP TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN 3, 5 (Mary Bissell & Jennifer L.
Miller eds., 2004), available at http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-data-
publications/data/using-subsidized-guardianship-improve-outcomes.pdf.
35 Youth themselves recognize this truth. See OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at
95 (youth reporting that opportunities for permanency exist in adoption, subsidized
guardianship, and even foster care, but that none guarantee absolute permanency).
The fluidity of families underlies the exception to the finality of judgments rule in
custody cases, where custody may be altered for a material change in circumstances.
See Bail, 938 P.2d at 212; LESLIEJOAN HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 684 (4th ed. 2010)
(noting that the changed circumstances exception is "almost universal").
35. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
1 Coupet, supra note 324, at 641 & n.201.
5 Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 2.04 (2002).
115 There is no reason to presume a greater level of conflict between a foster or
adoptive parent and a birth parent than between two divorcing spouses. See Garrison,
supra note 22, at 383-84.
. See OREGON REPORT, supra note 187, at. 71; see also Coupet, supra note 324, at
604 & n.27, (discussing how kinship caregivers often collaborate with parents to share
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CONCLUSION
The child welfare system is both dysfunctional and fundamentally
unfair, in large part because it relies on a flawed public policy story about
parenthood. Addressing child maltreatment effectively requires a delib-
erate acknowledgement of its actual causes, not a quick or simplistic
blaming of non-normative parents. This Article has started the process of
identifying those actual causes, but it is inevitably only a start. Numerous
aspects of the child welfare system deserve further study. Comprehensive
data collection on the reasons for children's removal from their parents,
for example, could lead to an honest assessment of the harm, if any, to
children from non-normative parental conduct, as well as to a more pre-
cise measurement of the impact on families of shortages of child care,
housing, and other resources. This data could also bring to light largely
overlooked correlations in the child welfare statutory regime-between
poverty and neglect, for instance-and thereby counteract common im-
plicit biases about particular families. Simply telling the real story of child
maltreatment would also reduce the stigma of families who need assis-
tance, as virtually every family sometimes does.
More research is likewise needed on different approaches to perma-
nency, parenthood, and the various custodial arrangements for families
involved with the child welfare system. Broadening our conceptions of
permanency and parenthood could well allow for the recognition of a va-
riety of parent-child bonds and the essential understanding that all fami-
ly relationships are complex and somewhat fragile. We know already that
children, their parents, and other adults are currently living and con-
nected in a multiplicity of settings beyond foster care and adoption. Mov-
ing beyond the "all or nothing" public parenthood story would accord
with the reality of families, a stated goal of family law, and help to bridge
the public and private family law systems. Only with such a shift can we
begin a dialogue to respect a variety of families while also achieving the
public's goal of protecting children. This Article is an attempt to start
that conversation.
childrearing responsibilities). Yet it often occurs outside the ambit of the child
welfare agency and court, and usually not in the adoption context.
3 As noted earlier, there has been little study of why children are actually
removed to foster care, and broad and vaguely worded neglect statutes allow for wide
and subjective interpretations. See supra Part II.B.2.a. Attention is beginning to come
to this issue, as evidenced for instance in the study of removals in Washington D.C.,
see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text, However, much work remains to be
done.
170 [Vol. 17:1
